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The Effect of Modern English 
Statute Law upon the Contractual 
Status of Infants. 
(Abbreviation, I. R. A.—Infants Relief Act\ 1874). 
The Infants' Relief Act has largely altered the 
contractual status of Infants. Before this Statute 
came into operation the contracts entered into by an 
Infant were, for the most part, regulated by the 
Common Law, with one principal statutory exception. 
This exception arose in connexion with an Infants' 
Marriage Settlement. Previous to the enactment in 
question, it had been decided that neither the approba-
tion of parents or guardians, nor even of the Court of 
Chancery would make in the Infants' settlement binding 
on him. This inconvenience called for Statute remedy, 
and in 1855, an Act was passed which enabled Male 
Infants not under 20, and Female Infants not under 17, 
with the approbation of the Court of Chancery, to make 
valid settlements of all their property real or personal 
and whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or 
expectancy, (18 and 19 Vict., c. ^j). Subject to 
the legal effect of this Statute, and the statutory 
necessity that ratifications of voidable executory 
contracts must be in writing, as required by Lord 
Tenterden's Act, 1829 (9 Geo., c. 14), and now re-
pealed as unnecessary, Common Law rules governed 
the contracts "of Infants. 
A 
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The object of this Essay is to exhibit the effect of 
modern English Statute Law upon the contractual 
status of Infants. In order to carry this out we will 
take the I . R. A. as a dividing line in time. The 
contracts to which an Infant can be a party will then 
be separated into divisions which from a legal stand-
point appear to be distinct. We will then endeavour 
to set out and illustrate the legal rules which governed 
each class of contract, previous to the operation of the 
I . R. A. The effect of this Act (if any) on each class 
will be noted and, if necessary, briefly discussed. Later 
modifications brought about by more recent legislation, 
and modifications entirely dependent on Statutory 
enactment subsequent to 1874, will also be dealt with. 
In treating of the contractual position before and after 
the I . R. A., we will, usually, consider first the Infants' 
liability, and secondly his rights against the other party. 
Before the I . R. A. became operative, the contracts 
to which an Infant might have been a party may be 
differentiated as follows — 
I . V O I D A B L E , i.e. capable of affirmation or rejec : 
tion at the Infant's option. 
I I . V A L I D , i.e. capable of being enforced against 
either party. 
I l l A B N O R M A L , i.e. of a nature peculiar to an 
Infant's position, as—Contracts of 
Apprenticeship. 
As a preliminary to the treatment of I , it is 
desirable to enquire if, by the Common Law, any 
contract entered into by an Infant was absolutely void. 
Such contracts as were manifestly to the prejudice 
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of the Infant are considered by some writers to 
have been void (Simpson, Infants 2nd edit., p. g). 
I f this view be correct, no such contract could ever be 
enforced against the Infant either during or after the 
period of infancy, whether ratified or not. I f a 4 * void" 
contract mean that the obligatory bond is never fastened, 
then, it would seem that the other party would also be 
free from liability. Eminent legal opinion, however, 
regards the contracts of Infants by Common Law to 
have been voidable only, even if such contracts were 
clearly not for the Infants' benefit (.Anson, Contracts, 
jth edit., p. ioy). There are cases indeed in which it 
has been said that such and such a contract is void, but 
they are cases in which it was not necessary to dis-
tinguish between void and voidable contracts. Between 
void and voidable acts and contracts there is much 
confusion in the older books. The distinction between 
these two terms must always cut keenly, but we submit 
that the view before quoted from Sir Wm. Anson may 
be safely taken as the most correct attainable. 
The importance indeed of the distinction is now 
much lessened by the effect of the I . R. A. Under 
this Statute large classes of contracts previously void-
able are now incapable of ratification, and unenforceable 
against the Infant under any conditions. Supposing, 
however, the legal opinion before-mentioned be open to 
doubt, there is still a class of contracts, viz. :—those 
which involve continuous liabilities, rights and duties— 
formerly voidable, and still held to be outside the 
operation of the Statute—regarding which the differen-
tiation of "void" and "voidable" is of consequence. 
This importance arises from the fact that the acqui-
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escence of the Infant after the attainment of majority 
affirms this kind of contract, and this acquiescence 
cannot make a contract binding which was actually 
void. The liability of the other party would in addition 
be affected, if we take "void" to mean, that no 
obligatory bond was formed at all, and both parties are 
in the same legal situation as they were before. We 
again, however, submit that the opinion quoted is correct 
both for continuing and non-continuing contracts, 
viz.:—that previous to the operation of the I . R. A., 
the contracts of an Infant when not valid, were voidable 
at the option of the Infant. 
I . We now proceed to consider the contracts, 
which before 1874, were voidable at the option of the 
Infant. With the exception of contracts for necessaries, 
and a limited class of contracts for the benefit of the 
Infant, all contracts entered into by him were voidable 
at his option. 
"The general doctrine is," said the Court in 
Williams v. Moor, (1843), " t n a t a party may, after he 
" attains the age of 21 years, ratify, and so make him-
" self liable on contracts entered into during infancy." 
(Anson Contracts, ytk edit., p. ioj.) 
In all classes of voidable contracts before the 
I . R. A. the contract which an Infant had entered into 
with an adult was binding on the other party. The 
latter might therefore be sued for a breach of the 
contract, though he could not enforce it. (Holt v. 
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Ward Clarencieux, 1733, 2 Stra. 937; Warwick v. 
Bruce, 1813, 2 M. and S., 205). There was, however, 
one exception to this rule. An Infant could not obtain 
specific performance of a contract, for specific perform-
ance will not be granted where the remedy is not 
mutual. (Flight v. Bolland, 1828, 4 Russ., 2gS). This 
exception still holds good and is not affected by modern 
legislation. 
Some contracts, as before stated, were invalid unless 
ratified; in others ratification was implied, unless the 
Infant repudiated the agreement either before, or within 
a reasonable time after the attainment of full age. The 
I . R . A. has largely affected that class of contracts 
which required express ratification. On the other hand, 
contracts in which ratification was implied unless de-
finitely disaffirmed appear to retain the old legal status. 
We will therefore distinguish these two sub-classes of I . , 
viz.:— 
I A . Voidable contracts which needed for validity 
express ratification by the Infant. 
I B . Voidable contracts under which an Infant had 
acquired an interest in land or property of 
a permanent nature, to which obligations 
were attached, or which involved continuing 
rights and liabilities, and which, in order to 
be avoided required express disclaimer by 
him on his coming of age. 
I A . As before mentioned, the express ratification 
by the Infant which was necessary for the validity of 
these contracts, was, by Lord Tenterden's Act, required 
to be in writing, but this enactment has been rendered 
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unnecessary by statutory changes, and was repealed 
in 1875. 
The provisions of the Infants' Relief Act are as 
follows:-
1. " All contracts whether by specialty or by simple contract hence-
forth entered into by Infants for the repayment of money lent 
or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other 
than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts stated with 
Infants, shall be absolutely void: provided always that this 
enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an 
Infant may by any existing or future Statute, or by the rules 
of Common Law or Equity enter, except such as now by law 
are voidable." 
2. "No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon 
any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted 
during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age 
of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether 
there shall or shall not be any new con si deration for such 
promise or ratification after full age." 
We have to consider the effect of this Statute on 
contracts voidable by the Infant before the operation 
of the Act. Contracts voidable in the sense of requiring 
express ratification for legal validity : i.e., contracts 
under sub-heading I A . Section I . makes contracts 
entered into by Infants for the repayment of money 
lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be 
supplied, and all accounts stated with Infants, which 
before were voidable, absolutely void. The language 
is emphatic. An application was made in Keeping v. 
Brown, (1895 X L T. L. R., 595), where it was decided 
that where payment on account had been made in 
respect of purchases made during and after infancy, 
the vendor cannot appropriate the payment to the 
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purchases made during infancy. It is definitely stated 
in the section that contracts for necessaries, and con-
tracts into which an Infant might enter by any existing 
or future Statute, or by rules of Common Law or 
Equity, and which were not voidable at the date of the 
enactment, were not affected by the Act. Therefore 
contracts which before 1874 came under our headings 
I I . and I I I . , find their way past the Statute. 
Section I I . would seem to deal with all contracts 
except those, which, in the way of inclusion or exclusion 
come under the operation of section I . That is to say, 
contracts voidable previous to the operation of the 
I . R. A., and which are not of the kind rendered void 
by section I . , cannot be ratified under any circumstances 
on the attainment of full age. They are unenforceable 
against one of the parties, while the contracts specified 
in section 1. are styled "void." The distinction, how-
ever, would seem to be a very fine one, on account 
of the legal interpretation of the latter word being an 
uncertain sound. The result of the operation of the 
Statute is that ratification has altogether lost its former 
legal power of awaking the liability which slept during 
the period of infancy. I t was decided that the Act 
applied to ratifications made after its passing, of con-
tracts made before that time. (Exp. Kibble, 1875, 10 
Ch„ 373.) 
A good example of the application of section 11. to 
contracts of the kind we have been considering is 
Smith v. King (1892, 2 Q. B 547). We quote from 
Anson (Contracts, edit. 7, p. 113 and 114). 
King, an Infant, became liable to a firm of brokers 
for £547 : after he came of age they sued him, and he 
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compromised the suit by giving two bills of exchange 
for ^50. The firm endorsed one of the bills to Smith, 
who sued upon it. The Queen's Bench Division held 
that the bills were a promise, based on a new consider-
ation, to pay a debt contracted during minority, that 
here was a ratification of the sort contemplated by the 
Act, and that Smith could not recover. 
" We have in the present case," said Charles J . , " first a promise 
by King during his minority to pay a sum of money ; secondly 
a promise by him after full age to pay a portion of that sum. 
It is said that the forbearance of the then plaintiffs to carry 
on their action afforded a new consideration and a good con-
sideration for King's promise to pay the bills of exchange. In 
my opinion, however, that case is amply provided for by 
section 2 of the Act. I think that there was here a new con-
sideration for the defendant's promise ; but the section ex-
pressly says that no action shall be brought on such a promise 
even where there is a new consideration for it. The case of 
ex parte Kibble seems strongly to support that view. In that 
case the plaintiff had obtained a judgment by default for a 
debt incurred by the defendant during infancy, and the judg-
ment had been followed by a judgment debtor summons and 
a petition for an adjudication in bankruptcy. The Court in-
quired into the consideration for the judgment, and finding 
that it was a debt contracted during infancy held that section 
2 applied to the case, and dismissed the petition for adjudica-
tion." 
An Infants' trading debts it must be remembered 
come under the operation of the Statute. He cannot 
be sued on his trading debts, nor on contracts entered 
into by him for the purpose of carrying on a trade. He 
cannot be made bankrupt in respect of them. They 
are unenforceable against him. (Exp. Jones, in re 
Jones, 1881 ; 18 Ch., D. 109). In concluding this part 
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of the subject we again repeat that the Courts have kept 
voidable continuing contracts on much the same footing 
as of old. 
With regard to the legal position of the other con-
tracting party, it seems clear that in contracts which 
come under the operation of section I I . , no change has 
been made. Whether the void contracts which come 
under section I . have any obligatory hold on him is a 
question which, so far as we know, has not yet been 
brought before the Courts. I f by a "void" contract 
is meant that there is no vinculum juris, we cannot see 
how the liability of the adult party arises. Modern 
legal opinion appears, however, to hold the view that 
the liability exists. If that position be correct we 
can but say that the shifting meaning of " void " is 
further evidenced. 
Although the 1. R. A. has rendered express ratifi-
cation null and void, even though there be fresh con-
sideration for the promise made during infancy, there 
is often but a short step between the ratification of an 
old promise, and the making of a new one. Perhaps 
one effect of the I . R . A. has been to make the Courts 
studious to prevent the Infant abusing in this respect 
the privileges given by the Statute, which, to apply an 
old saw, were given for a shield not for a sword. The 
treatment by the Law of an Infants' promise to marry 
is illustrative of this. The legal effect of these cases 
is thus summed up by Sir William Anson (Contracts 
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p. 114). Where the parties to mutual promises of 
marriages remain on the footing of an engaged couple 
after the promisor has attained his majority, the main-
tenance of the engagement has been held to be a 
ratification, and to be insufficient to sustain an action 
for breach of the promise. But where the mutual 
promises made during infancy are conditional on con-
sent of the man's parents, and the promise is renewed 
by him after majority with their consent; or where an 
engagement is made during minority with no date fixed 
for the marriage, and after the man comes of age, the 
parties agree to name a day on which it shall take place, 
the promises so made have been held to be new 
promises, and the breach of them is actionable. Cases 
quoted (Coxhead v. Afu/h's, 1878, 3 C. P. D., 439; 
Nortkcote v. Doughty, 1879, 4 C. P. D., 385 ; Ditcham 
v. Worrall, 1880, 5 C. P. D., 410). 
Two recent cases of a more general character seem 
also to shew that under certain circumstances in spite 
of the Act, the ratification of voidable contracts re-
appears with a slightly altered face. In Walton v. 
Etherington (1884, 1 T. L. R., 396), an Infant entered 
into an employment, and covenanted, under a penalty, 
that he would not on leaving solicit his employer's cus-
tomers. The Infant remained on in the employment 
after having attained 21. It was held, that assuming 
the original contract was void, the proper inference to 
draw was that there was a new contract of service 
entered into after the Infant came of age. 
Again in Brown v. Harper (1893, T. L. R. ix., 
429), the defendant, while an Infant, in a contract of 
service to the plaintiff bound himself by a penalty not 
I I 
to do certain acts, but after attaining the age of 21 he 
continued in the service as before and his wages were 
from time to time increased. In an action for injunction 
to restrain the defendant from doing the acts referred 
to, it was held, that, even if the original contract was 
void, the Court would infer that a new contract was 
entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant 
after the latter had come of age, and that the plaintiff 
was entitled to the injunction. 
In his judgment in the case of Ditcham v. Worrall 
(1880) before referred to, Lindley, L.J., said :— 
" A so-called ratification which introduces new terms and stipula-
tions, is, at least as to these, a new promise, and is binding as 
such if there is a consideration. to support it, but not other-
wise. Where there is a consideration and no new terms 
introduced, the intention of the parties, if clearly expressed, 
will afford a test whereby to determine whether there has been 
a new promise or only a ratification of a former promise. But 
where the intention of the parties respecting this particular 
point is obscure, their words or conduct ought to be so inter-
preted as to render valid the transaction in which they were 
engaged, if it is also clear that this result, at all events, was 
intended by them, or if there is no law rendering such inter-
pretation inadmissible." 
We now submit with much doubt and hesitation 
that another class of contract was before the I . R. A. 
voidable, but now by its operation is incapable of ratifi-
cation. In the preliminary analysis we stated that a 
class of contract previous to the Act was valid. A 
I 2 
prominent example of this class was a contract by which 
an Infant obtained employment enabling him to live. 
This contract, as we shall see, is valid still, and recent 
legislation has but regulated and developed the old 
legal position. But suppose a contract of this nature 
purporting to confer this benefit on the minor, but con-
taining extraordinary and unusual terms neither reason-
able nor for the Infant's benefit. In Clements v. 
L. & N. W.R. Co. (1894, T. L. R. x., 236), Mathew, J , 
said in the course of his judgment :— 
" It would be impossible to frame any deed between master and 
servant in which there might not be some provisions against 
the servant. I f we find any stipulations in the deed which 
make the whole unfair, then it would be void. But the stipu-
lation must be so unfair as to make the whole unfair to render 
it void agai?ist the Infant." 
According to this judgment it is quite possible for 
an Infant's contract by which he obtains employment to 
be "void." Taken in connexion with Fry L. J.'s judg-
ment in Francesco v. Barnum, 1890 (T. L. R., vi. 463), 
which is approved, we would gather the decision has old 
foundations: Therefore it would be correct to have said, 
before 1874, that an Infant's contract of this kind, 
might be described as "void"; as "void" it might be 
to-day. But as we have seen, high legal opinion states 
that an Infant's contract was never "void," but 
" voidable " only. We repeat that the legal meaning 
of "void" has been fluttering and uncertain, but this 
really lessens the difficulty here. We submit (1). That 
previous to the I . R. A., an unsuitable contract pro-
fessing to enable an Infant to earn his living was "void" 
in the sense of being unenforceable against the Infant 
i3 
whilst an Infant, but capable of ratification if the 
Infant was unwise enough to ratify it on attaining 
majority. (2). That since the I . R. A. became law 
such a contract now, as before, is 4< void " against the 
Infant whilst an Infant, and also "void" when he has 
left infancy behind in the sense of being unenforceable 
against him whether he ratify or not, 
lacuppopt of-the view thoit thu WTTTCI - void" is 
capable of the interpretation suggested, we would refer 
to Flower v. L. & N. W. R. Co.y 1894 (T. L. R. x., 
427). This was a contract professing to enable a boy 
to proceed cheaply and expeaitiously to his daily work, 
but with various conditions/ attached which were pre-
judicial to the Infant. The Infant was held not to be 
bound by the contract, and though the word "void" 
does not seem to have bfeen used, the judgment may be 
said to run on the same lines as the two decisions 
already referred to. The expressions are but "unen-
forceable " writ large. / 
A. L . Smith, L . J . said( " The question was, whether the agree-
ment as a whole, Xvas so much to the detriment of the Infant 
m metke ri u)fjruif that M shuuM he nmrW by it." 
In considering non-continuing voidable contracts 
previous to, and as affected by the I . R. A., we have con-
fined ourselves to those of an executory nature. I f 
consideration passed, what was the legal position before 
1874 and what is it now ? 
When the Infant had received or enjoyed the con-
sideration or part of it, he might avoid the contract but 
could not recover the purchase money. I f he bought 
goods or used them, the same consequences would 
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follow. (Simpson, Infants, 2nd edit., p. 75, quoting 
L. & N. W.R. v. McMichaeL 1850). Since the I . R. A. 
the Infant may claim that the contract is void or un-
enforceable against him by Statute, but the Courts 
would take a similar view as before regarding the 
return of consideration. Where an Infant had hired 
and occupied a house and bought and used the furniture 
in it, it was held that he could not recover part of the 
price of the furniture already paid, although he obtained 
relief from future liabilities. (Valentini v. Canali, 
1889, 24 Q. B. D., 166.) 
Said Lord Coleridge in this case :— 
" When an Infant has paid for something and has consumed or 
used it, it is contrary to natural justice that he should recover 
back the money which he has paid." 
In short before as well as after the I . R. A. an 
Infant's right on avoiding a contract, to recover back 
money paid by him (whether the avoidance be by 
Common Law right or by Statute) seems to depend on 
the question whether he has derived any benefit from 
the contract. 
If the consideration has moved from the Infant, 
and he has received nothing, he could by avoiding the 
contract recover the consideration or obtain a monetary 
equivalent (Coape v. Overton, 1833, 10 Bing, 252). 
We are not able to quote a case to shew that since the 
I . R. A. this principle would still be upheld in connexion 
with this particular species of contract. We submit 
that as in Hamilton v. Vaugkan, Sherrin Electrical 
Engineering Co., 1894, 3 ch., 587, the decision is 
followed in the case of continuing contracts, the Courts 
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would follow similar lines with regard to contracts 
under I A . We do not forget that here again the 
meaning of the word "void" in section I . of the I . R. A. 
may be of importance. Is the other party bound at 
all ? I f some modern legal opinion is right in asserting 
that he is in executory contracts, he is a fortiori in 
this case. I f the opinion be incorrect to use Lord 
Coleridge's words before quoted " i t is contrary to 
natural justice " he should be free when he uses the 
Infant's consideration without return, and the Courts 
would doubtless find means of ensuring that " natural 
justice " is satisfied. 
Subsequent to the I . R. A., there is only one other 
Statute which materially affects the class of contracts 
we have been considering, viz.:—The Betting and 
Loans (Infants') Act, 1892, (55 Vict., c. 4), section 5 
of which provides 
" I f any Infant, who has contracted a loan which is void in law, 
agrees after he comes of age to pay any money which in whole 
or in part represents or is agreed to be paid in respect of any 
such loan, and is not a new advance, such agreement, and any 
instrument, negotiable or other, given in pursuance of or for 
carrying into effect such agreement, or otherwise in relation to 
the payment of money representing or in respect of such loan, 
shall, as far as it relates to money which represents or is pay-
able in respect of such loan, and is not a new advance, be 
void absolutely as against all persons whomsoever." 
" For the purposes of this section any interest, commission, or 
other payment in respect of such loan shall be deemed to be 
a part of such loan." 
This enactment appears but to strengthen section 
I . of the I . R. A. The words "absolutely void as 
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against all persons whomsoever" certainly seem to give 
" v o i d " here the meaning of unenforceable. I f " v o i d " 
means that the lender and the borrower are not, on 
account of the character of their agreement, bound 
together by any obligation the word of itself would be 
sufficient, and the five words fol lowing a redundancy. 
The result of the section we submit, is simply to 
strengthen the legal for t already erected by the I . R. A . 
to defend the Infant f rom the monev lender. 
IB.—Continuing Contracts. 
Before the I . R. A . these contracts were voidable 
by the Infant, but there must have been an express 
disaffirmation within a reasonable time after the attain-
ment of majority, or the Infant would be bound. As 
previously stated, continuing contracts may be generally 
described as contracts under which an Infant has ac-
quired an interest in land or property of a permanent 
nature, to which obligators are attached, or which in -
volve continuing rights and liabilities. Contracts 
relating to land, marriage settlements, contracts of 
partnership, the contracts express or implied, entered 
into by the shareholder in a Company are leading 
examples of continuing contracts. The question at 
first sight appears very natural :—Does not the I . R. A . 
in one or other of its sections affect all contracts o f 
Infants voidable before its operation ; there is no 
exemption of a particular species of such contract ? 
i7 
U n t i l various cases involv ing these contracts came be-
fore the Courts there seems to have been some doubt as 
to the effect of the Statute. In Chit ty on Contracts, i i t h 
edit., p. 153, i t is stated that " I t may be questioned 
whether the Statute was intended to apply to those 
cases in which, as we have seen, the ratification of a 
continuing contract made by an Infant has been implied 
f rom his acts and conduct after he came of age." 
T h e word "voidable' ' would seem to have a some-
what different signification in connexion with the con-
tracts under the respective headings I A and I B . Con-
tracts which required express ratification might be 
described as " invalid until confirmed." Continuing 
contracts as " valid unti l repudiated." I t is submitted 
that the second section of the I . R. A . might r ight ly 
or wrongly have a very wide construction given to it, 
in fact so as to leave l i t t le room for the operation of 
section I . Nevertheless its language might certainly 
be construed as fai l ing to include contracts "val id unti l 
repudiated." Ratification as read in the section requires 
positive action ; potentiality has to be translated into 
actuality. Section I . , as we have seen, applies only to 
three kinds of contracts. I t has been thought that the 
language of the proviso enlarges the class of contracts 
fa l l ing wi th in the enactment, but so far as we know the 
best legal opinion coincides wi th the decision of M r . 
Justice Kekewich in Duncan v. Dixon (1890, L . T . R. 
v i . , 222). I t is interesting to notice that in the course 
of his judgment he said, " I find i t difficult to connect 
" the first and second sections of the Act together so 
" as to make a coherent whole." 
Whatever value this reasoning may have, the fact 
B 
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remains, that continuing contracts which formerly 
needed renunciation by the Infant i f he would avoid 
them, are not affected by the I . R. A . Leading cases 
which establish this important point are Wkittingham 
v. Murdy, 1889, 60 L . T . 956 ; Carter v, Silber, 1892, 
2 Ch. (C .A. ) , 278. I n the former case an Infant had 
become a member of a Bui lding Society, had received 
an allotment of land, and for four years after he came 
o f age had paid instalments of the purchase money. 
Then he endeavoured to repudiate the contract. I n 
the course of his judgment Hawkins, J., said :— 
" The question I have to decide is, whether the contract he [the 
Infant] entered into was void or merely voidable, . . . I 
do not think the original contract was void. The defendant 
had a right when he came of age to say, I entered into the 
contract while I was a minor, and I now wish to repudiate it. 
The Act of Parliament (37 and 38 Vict, c. 62) does not 
affect such a contract as this. There were many cases cited 
before me to support this, but it is unnecessary to consider 
them at length, as the case of L. & N. W.R. Co. v. 
McMichael, 1850 (5 Ex. 97), lays down the principle of law 
and represents the view I take of it. In that case, as here, 
the Infant contracted in respect of a subject of a permanent 
nature. As it is not denied it was presumably for his benefit 
at the time he made the contract. Under these circumstances 
an Infant is entitled to repudiate, but if he does not, the con-
tract is treated as still existing, especially if he actually ratifies 
it" 
I t w i l l be noticed that the Judge supports his de-
cision in 1889 wi th a case adjudicated on in 1850, and 
expressly states that the 1874 Ac t does not apply. 
A n Infant who becomes a partner and so makes 
himself a party to an important species of continuing con-
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tract, is in the same legal position as he was in 1821. I n 
that year Goode v. Harrison (5 B. and A i d . 159) was 
decided W e give the case as quoted by Sir W m . 
Anson :— 
" Where an Infant held himself out as in partnership with X, and 
continued to act as a partner till shortly before he came of 
age, and then, though ceasing to act as a partner, did nothing 
to disaffirm the partnership, he was held liable on debts which 
accrued, after he came of age, to persons who supplied X with 
goods." 
<f Here," said Best, J . , " the Infant, by holding himself out as a 
partner, contracted a continual obligation, and that obligation 
remains till he thinks proper to put an end to it . . . . 
If he wished it to be understood as no longer continuing a 
partner, he ought to have notified it to the world." 
The law is the same now. I f an Infant desires to 
retire f rom a firm he must express his determination 
speedily and unequivocally on attaining 21. (Simpson, 
Infants. 2nd edit., p. ^7, quoting Lindley Partnership, 
5th ed i t , p. 76). Whi le he remains an Infant he incurs 
no liabil i ty (Lovellv. Beauckamp, 1894, App., Cas. 607. 
A s between the partners the Infant cannot insist that 
he shall be credited wi th profits and not be debited 
wi th losses (L. & N. W. R. Co. v. McMichael, 1850). I f 
on attaining his majority, his share in the assets being 
insufficient to answer his share of the losses, the other 
parties sue h im for contribution, possibly the I . R. A . 
(section I . ) might be relied on for defence. I f this is 
correct a solitary exception to our statement o f the 
non-effect of the Statute on this class of contract is 
provided. 
T h e modern case Carter v. Silber, before referred 
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to has primary reference to that k ind of continuing 
contract so well known as a settlement. Lindley, L . J -
said that the deed in question was voidable and not 
void. Also he said "it was well settled law that such 
"a settlement was binding upon the Infant unless and 
" until he repudiated it" Before 1855, indeed, except in 
the case of a settlement by a female Infant of her 
chattels real, or personal estate, to which the adult 
husband became entitled on the marriage, and in the 
settlement of which he concurred, repudiation could 
always take place within a legally reasonable time. 
Th i s exception, however, no longer exists, being put 
an end to by the Married Women's Property Act , 1882. 
This defect of an Infant's personal incapacity could 
not be supplied by the consideration of a competent 
settlement, the concurrence of parents or guardians, nor 
an order of the Court. The law is st i l l the same, 
except when settlements are made under the Statute 
about to be mentioned. (Field v. Moore, 1855, 7 De 
G. M . & G., 691 ; Seaton v. Seaton, 1888, 13 App. , 
Cas. 61.) 
By the Infant's Settlement Act , 1855 (br ief ly 
before referred to), of i t is enacted that 
" From and after the passing of this Act, it shall be lawful for every 
Infant upon or in contemplation of his or her marriage, with 
the sanction of the Court of Chancery, to make a valid and 
binding settlement, or contract for a settlement, of all or any 
part of his or her property, or property over which he or she 
has any power of appointment, whether real or personal, and 
whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy -f 
and every conveyance, appointment, and assignment of such 
real or personal estate, or contract to make a conveyance, 
appointment, or assignment thereof, executed by such Infant, 
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with the approbation of the said Court, for the purpose of 
giving effect to such settlement, shall be as valid and effectual 
as i f the person executing the same were of the full age of 21 
years. Provided always that this enactment shall not extend 
to powers of which it is expressly declared that they shall not 
be exercised by an Infant." (Section I.) 
Section I V . provides 
"That nothing in this Act shall apply to any male Infant under 
the age of 20 years, or to any female Infant under the age of 
17 years." 
Under the Judicature Acts various orders have 
been made regulating procedure under the Statute, and 
the action of the Court under different circumstances 
is governed by sections I I . and I I I . I t has been 
decided by the Court of Appeal that the Ac t extends 
to post-nuptial settlements, i f the Infant is a ward of 
Cour t ; (Re Sampson and Wall, 25 Ch., D . 467), and 
by the Chancery Division that there is jurisdiction to 
direct a settlement under it, after a married female 
Infant has attained the age of 17, before which age the 
A c t does not apply; but the House of Lords has 
expressly refused to decide the point, and i t must be 
considered doubtful (Seaton z>. Seaton, 13 App. , Cas. 61). 
T h e House of Lords also laid i t down that the A c t 
removed the disability of Infancy only, leaving 
unaffected the disability of coverture (Seaton v. Seaton)y 
but this decision can have but l i t t le practical effect, owing 
to the effect upon the latter disability of the Marr ied 
Women's Property Act , 1882. (See Simpson, Infants, 
2nd edit,, p. 34r and345.) 
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A n Infant may be a shareholder in a Company. 
Th is is expressly contemplated in Companies formed 
under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act , 1845. 
(S Vict., c. 16), for by section 79 provision is made for 
a minor voting. There is nothing in the Companies 
Act, 1862, to prevent an Infant being a shareholder. 
H e may subscribe the Memorandum of Association 
(In re Arassau Phosphate Co., 1876, 2 Ch., D . 610). 
H e cannot, however, compel the Company to register 
him as a shareholder (R. v. Midland Co., 9, L . T . 
N . S., 155), and i f he has been registered, on the 
Company discovering that he is an infant, they may 
reject h im as a shareholder. (Simpson, Contracts, 2nd 
edit., p. 48 and 49.) , I f shares have been transferred 
to an Infant, the transfer is voidable not only at the 
the option of the Infant, but also at the option of the 
Company. {Gooctis case, 1872, L . R., 8 Ch., 266 ; 
Curtis s case, 1868, L . R., 6 Eq. , 455). If , however, 
the Infant be accepted as a shareholder, what is his 
legal position ? Th is l iabil i ty was, and is still, similar in 
principle to that which arose and still arises in connexion 
wi th the other classes of continuing contracts we have 
mentioned. I f he wish to repudiate his shares he must 
do so plainly and within a reasonable time after the 
attainment of majority. But he is also liable in case o f 
non-repudiation to calls which have accrued dur ing 
infancy (See cases quoted by Simpson, Contracts, p. 49). 
I f the Company be wound up during the infancy of the 
shareholder, his name must be struck of f the list o f 
contributories (Symons case, 1870, L . R., 5 Ch., 298). 
I f he is of age, the question depends upon whether or 
no he has elected to take shares, i.e., whether he has 
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repudiated the shares within a reasonable time after 
coming of age, or whether he has exercised acts o f 
ownership over the shares. I f the former question be 
answered in the negative, and the latter in the affirma-
tive, he is liable to contribution (Luntsderis case, 1868, 
L . R., 4 Ch., 31 ; Dublin and Wicklow Ry. Co. v. Blacky 
1870, L . R., 8 Ex. 181). 
As an example of the non-application of the I . R. A . 
to contracts of this nature, we mention a case decided 
in 1888 (In re Yeoland's Consols, 58, L . T . , 922). 
Here an Infant received an assignment of shares in 
1883 ; he said he would repudiate them, but did not do 
so. H e reached fu l l age in 1886; in 1887, the 
Company was wound up and he was not permitted to 
take his name off the list of contributories. 
I n all continuing contracts as in contracts of an 
executory nature, to which an Infant is a party, the 
general rule is that the parties other than the Infant, 
provided they possess fu l l legal capacity, are bound. 
I t may be said to be wi th in the sphere of exception to 
this rule, that (1.) the transfer of shares to an Infant is, 
as we have stated, voidable at the option of the 
Company as well as the option o f the Infant, and (2.) 
that where the Company at the time of the Infants 
coming of age is being wound up, that even i f the 
Infant wish to retain the shares, his name may be 
removed f rom the register at the instance o f the 
liquidator. (Simpson, Infants, p. 50.) 
W h a t is a reasonable time to be allowed for 
repudiation depended and depends on the circumstances 
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of each case. When the Infant has derived no benefit 
f rom the contract, and the position of other parties has 
not been affected by the delay, the contract may be 
repudiated after a very considerable time. Thus in 
one case i t was held that a lady could repudiate a settle-
ment made by her 37 years previously as under i t she 
had not received any income. (In re Jones, Farrington 
v. Forrester, 1893, 2 ch., 461). I n the two leading 
cases Whittingkam v. Murdy and Carter v. Silber 
already quoted for other purposes this question of time 
of repudiation arose. I n the former the payment of 
four and a-half years' subscriptions to the Bui ld ing 
Society effectually excluded repudiation. I n the latter 
i t was held that an attempt to renounce a marriage 
settlement five years after the attainment of majori ty 
was not repudiation within a reasonable time. I n an 
ordinary case of partnership l iabil i ty decided 80 years 
ago, four months' acquiescence after coming of age wa,s 
held sufficient to bind the Infant (Holmes v. Blogg, 
1817, 8 Taun 39). 
A n Infant shareholder, knowing he is on the 
Company's register, has been held to be bound by delays 
of one. year, two years, or even five months, coupled 
wi th a transfer of some of the shares. (Simpson, 
Infants, p. 49 and 50, and cases there quoted.) 
I f an Infant avoid a continuing contract on coming 
of age, from which contract he has received no benefit, 
can he recover back money paid by him ? W e have 
seen that an affirmative answer was given to this 
question in executory contracts by Coape v. Overton 
in 1833, and we submitted would still be given by the 
Courts. W i t h regard to the class we are now con-
sidering the modern leading case is, we believe, 
Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin Electrical Engineering 
Co., 1894, 3 Ch., 589. Here a lady aged 18 had allotted 
to her 20 £5 shares on which she paid ^ 6 0 . The 
Company afterwards went into liquidation, and on re-
pudiating the shares, she was allowed to prove for the 
amount paid up. T h e old cases Holmes v. Blogg, 1817, 
8 Taun 508 ; and Ex parte Taylor, 1856, 8 De G. M . 
and G. 254, were followed in principal and the circum-
stances distinguished. For the Infant to recover his 
consideration i t must be clearly shewn he has derived 
no benefit f rom the contract. T h e two cases mentioned 
above are still law, the first refers to a contract relating 
to leaseholds, the later one to a contract of partnership. 
T o both these kinds of continuous contracts we infer 
the principle acted on in the 1894 case would apply, i f 
the Infant party wished to recover consideration. 
W e now proceed to consider Infants' contracts 
which are " v a l i d " and come,under heading I I . W e 
wi l l sub-divide them as follows :— 
IIA.—Contracts for Necessaries. 
IIB.—Contracts under the Infants' 
Settlement Act, 1855. 
lie.—Other Valid Contracts. 
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11A.—Contracts for Necessaries. 
The term 4 < necessaries " in relation to an Infant 's 
contract does not mean only such things as food, 
clothing, or lodging, which are necessary to the support 
of life. '* Such Articles as are necessary and suitable 
1 4 to the station, degree, and condition of the Infant ," 
come under the term. (Peters v. Fleming, 1840, 6 M . 
and W . , p. 46.) W h a t these articles are, in a particular 
case, is a question of mixed law and fact. As to the 
respective provinces of Judge and Jury in the decision 
see Anson s Contracts, 7th ed i t , p. 114 and 115. 
Articles which are purely ornamental can never 
be considered necessaries, because they cannot be 
requisite to anyone (Peters v. Fleming; Ryder v. 
Wombwell, 1868, L . R. 4., Ex. 32). For a long list of 
articles held to be " necessary " and " non-necessary," 
under many differing circumstances, see Simpsons 
Infants, 2nd edit., p. 90-92. The limits of legal neces-
saries are wide, varying f rom daily bread to a racing 
bicycle. (Clyde Cycle Co. v. Hargreaves, 1898, T . L . R. 
xiv. , 338.) 
Education in a trade may be considered a necessary 
and under certain circumstances the Infant is liable on 
a bond to pay a reasonable premium. (Walter v. 
Everard, 1891, T . L . R. v i i . 469.) 
Can articles be considered as necessaries when at 
the time of their purchase by the Infant, he was 
sufficiently supplied with things o f the same kind ? 
Elementary text-books might be a necessary to a 
student of law, but hardly eight or ten copies o f 
Stephen's Commentaries. T h e older cases were some-
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what in conflict on this point. But in Johnstone v. 
Marks (19 Q. B. D . 509), decided in 1887, i t was held 
that— 
" It lies upon the plaintiff to prove, not that the goods supplied 
belong to the class of necessaries as distinguished from that of 
luxuries, but that the goods supplied, when supplied, were 
necessaries for the Infant. The fact that the Infant was 
sufficiently supplied at the time of the additional supply is 
obviously material to this issue as well as fatal to the con-
tention of the plaintiff in respect of it." 
I t is in regard to this over-supply of necessaries 
we have to mention the only direct effect o f modern 
legislation on the Infant's contract for necessaries. T h e 
Sale of Goods A c t 1893 ( 5 6 a n c * 57 Vict. , c. 71) 
section I I . enacted that capacity to buy and sell is 
regulated by the general law concerning capacity to 
contract and to transfer and acquire property: provided 
that where necessaries are sold and delivered to an 
Infant, or minor, he must pay a reasonable price there-
for. T h e term " necessaries " means goods suitable to 
the condition in life of such Infant or minor, and to his 
actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery. 
This enactment did li t t le more than translate case 
law into Statute law. 
A false impression which the Infant may have 
conveyed to the tradesman as to his station and circum-
stances wi l l not affect his l iabil i ty : i f a tradesman 
supplies expensive goods to an Infant because he thinks 
that the Infant's circumstances are better than in fact 
they are, or i f he supplies goods of a useful class not 
knowing that the Infant is already sufficiently supplied 
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he does so at his peril . (Anson Contracts, 7th ed i t , 
p. 115 and 116.) 
Even i f given in exchange for necessaries an 
Infant cannot bind himself by a bi l l of exchange or a 
promissory note ( I n , re Soltykoff> 1891, 1 Q. B. 
413). The I . R. A . has affected the contracts of 
Infants which arise under these negotiable instruments. 
Before they were voidable, now they are void. I n -
directly, therefore, the Statute may be said to have 
slightly altered the legal position of the Infant's con-
tract for necessaries. 
W i t h regard to an Infant's l iabil i ty on a bond 
entered into by him for necessaries we would quote a 
portion of L o r d Esher's judgment in Walter v. Everard 
( T . L . R. v i i . , 469, 1891). 
" The first and greatest authority on the subject was a statement of 
Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 172, A.), in which he laid down that if 
an Infant entered into a double bond—that was to say, a bond 
for double the amount due, or a bond for a penalty in order to 
secure the payment of an amount due from him, he could not 
be sued on the bond; but if he entered into a single bond— 
that was to say, for the amount due only, to secure the pay-
ment of a sum due from him for necessaries—he could be 
sued on that bond. That seemed most sensible, for, since i f 
there was no bond the Infant could be sued for necessaries 
supplied to him, it was the height of unreasonable technicality 
to say that because he had given a bond he could not be sued 
for the price of the necessaries A person might, 
therefore, be sued on a bond entered into by him while an 
Infant for necessaries, but the action must be treated as i f 
there were no deed, and the plaintiff must show that the 
things supplied were necessaries to the Infant; that they had 
been supplied to the Infant by him; and that the price asked 
for them was reasonable/' 
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T h e bond consequently appears to be free f rom 
Statutory influence when given by the Infant for 
necessaries, provided i t does not take the form of a 
penalty bond. 
I t was long ago the equitable doctrine that one 
who lent money to an Infant to pay a debt for 
necessaries was entitled to stand in the place of the 
creditor for necessaries. (Mar low v. Pitfield, 1719, 
I . P. Wms. 558). Th i s doctrine has been undisturbed 
by legislation. 
T h e Infant's contracts for necessaries have then, 
wi th the exceptions mentioned, been regulated by 
"judge-made " law since L o r d Coke wrote " A n Infant 
" m a y bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, 
" d r i n k , apparel, necessary physicke, and such other 
" necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching or 
"instruction, whereby he may profit himself after-
awards." (Co. Litt., 172 A.). 
IIB.—Contracts valid under the Infants' 
Settlement Act, 1855. 
For the purpose of this thesis we have writ ten 
sufficiently at length regarding this species of contract, 
when treating it as an important Statutory exception, to 
the voidable continuing contract of Settlement. 
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I He.—Other Valid Contracts. 
T h e I . R. A . by the wording o f its sections leaves 
unaffected the contracts of Infants valid before 1874. 
T h e chief, perhaps the only, example of such contracts 
valid by Statute previous to that date we have already 
shortly dealt with . Contracts which by the rules o f 
Common Law or Equi ty were binding before the A c t 
came into operation are now the subject of enquiry. A n 
attempt wi l l be made to state clearly their legal features 
unaffected by Statute; and then very cursorily to exhibit 
these features modified and altered by some members of 
that large family of Statutes of the last 25 years, which 
have so strongly influenced the social and industrial life 
o f the Country. Sir W m . Anson says (Contracts, 7th 
edit., p. 111), " T h e only illustration (of this k ind of con-
tract) which I can adduce is a contract securing per-
manent employment to an Infant and the means of 
maintaining himself." W e can suggest no addition. 
The Infant's contract whereby he secures employment 
wi l l therefore be considered as equivalent to " other 
valid contracts" under our heading I l i e . 
W e may submit that a locus classicus on this sub-
ject is the judgment of Fry , L . J., in De Francesco v. 
Bamum, 1890, T . L . R. v i . , p. 464. F rom this judg-
ment we make the fol lowing extract :— 
" From the earliest days it had been held that an Infant cannot 
bind himself by a contract, but to this there were well-known 
exceptions; one such exception was that an Infant could enter 
into a contract for being taught a profession or occupation by 
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which he might thereafter be benefitted, another exceptions 
based on the desirability of an Infant being employed, wa, 
that of a contract by which he obtained employment enabling 
him to live. Therefore a contract by an Infant to learn a 
trade or business was primi facia binding on the Infant. But 
to this there were well-defined and well-known exceptions. 
Where the contract contained extraordinary and unusual terms, 
and it was not reasonable and for the benefit of the Infant, the 
contract was void. It was obvious that such a contract must 
contain some clauses that were not for the benefit of the 
Infant; it must contain some terms for the benefit of one 
party to it and some for the benefit of the other party. The 
question, therefore, was one of fact, whether the contract, as 
as a whole, was for the benefit of the Infants." 
T h e " In fan t s" in this case were apprentices rather 
than servants under age, but the Judge, it is noted, 
applies the same law, so far as relates to the validity 
and the fairness or unfairness of the terms, to both 
classes of contracting parties. The contract into which 
an Infant apprentice enters for being taught an occupa-
tion—the contract into which a minor enters for obtain-
ing means to enable him to live—are alike binding on 
the apprentice and the servant. The legal standard of 
benefit derived is also similar for both. As further 
evidence that these are correct, we also extract f rom 
the judgment in Corn v. Matthews, 1893, T . L R. ix. , 
183. 
"The mere fact that some of the conditions in the deed are 
against the apprentice does not enable us to say that the 
agreement is void. It would be impossible to frame any deed 
between master and servant in which there might not be some 
provisions against the servant. If we find any stipulations in 
the deed which make the whole unfair, then it would be void. 
But the stipulation must be so unfair as to make the whole 
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unfair to render it void against the Infant. These observations 
equally apply to a contract of service and employment with 
an Infant." 
We have already attempted to deal with the legal 
aspect of contracts of service and employment which 
are vitiated by conditions grossly unfair to the Infant 
party. I f the contract be legally " fa i r " to the minor 
and he is therefore bound by it, in case of a breach, 
what in general terms are his liabilities ? Outside 
Statutory enactment he seems to be liable for damages 
or to an injunction, but not for a penalty. Riley, an 
Infant, entered into a contract with the Farmers and 
Cleveland Dairies Co. to serve them as a milk-seller on 
certain terms set forth, in a special agreement, one of 
which was that he would not carry on any such business 
within five miles of H ull ; and that if he did, he would 
forfeit and pay to his employers £25. It was alleged 
that he had so acted as to incur the penalty, which the 
Company sued for. The case was brought on appeal 
before the Q. B. Division, from the Hull County Court 
Judge who had decided against the Company. The 
Court upheld the decision. The Judge, they said, had 
followed the ancient and well-established rule of law, 
that an Infant was not liable for a penalty. (Farmers 
and Cleveland Dairies Co, v. Riley, 1893, T . L . R. ix., 
260.) Two cases tried before North, J., were quoted, 
viz., Evans v. Ware (1892) and Batkov. Tunks (1892). 
The Court said that in these decisions the Judge had 
only stated that damages might be recovered. But there 
was all the distinction in the world between damages— 
that is, the real damages caused—and a penalty which 
might be a hundred times the real damage. 
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As has been stated the law relating to Master and 
Servant, Employer and Workman, &c, where the 
second named person in both cases is an Infant, has 
come within the grasp of several modern Statutes. But a 
regulated expansion rather than an attenuation has been 
thereby given. The underlying idea is still the same, 
viz., an aiming at the benefit of the Infant. The minor 
cannot be held liable for breach of contract under any of 
these modern enactments if the agreement has been 
decidedly against his best interests, for if thus in-
validated, we hold, as before stated, it passes over to the 
ranks of the old voidable contracts rendered incapable 
of ratification by the 1874 Act. Under 39 and 40 Vict., 
c. 22, s. 9, any person over 16 may become a member 
of a trade union unless it is otherwise provided by the 
rules. An Infant may enter into a valid contract by bond 
under the Customs Act (39 and 40 Vict., c. 36, s. 165). 
He may become a member of a building society (37 
and 38 Vict., c. 42, s. 38), or a friendly society (38 and 
39 Vict., c. 60, s. 15). In these last two cases, 
however, his contracts might be of the continuing 
class and so could be directly repudiated after majority 
if the minor wished to be free from liability. An 
important Statute affecting the contract of employ-
ment is "The Employers and Workmen Act, 1875" 
(38 and 39 Vict., c. 90), which enlarged the jurisdiction 
of the County Court in cases of dispute between 
employers and workmen. The Act also gives juris-
diction in cases of disputes where the amount claimed 
does not exceed £ 1 0 , to Courts of summary jurisdiction 
which it carefully defines. The workman must be "one 
engaged in "manual labour." He maybe.?/*?*- under,and 
c 
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the A c t wi l l apply to such an one i f he has entered into, 
or worked under, a contract wi th an employer, whether 
express or implied, oral or in wri t ing, and whether a 
contract of service or one personally to execute any 
work or labour. I n 1877 an Infant was held liable for 
breach of covenant under this Ac t {Leslie v. Fitzpatrick, 
3 Q. B. D . 229), the Court being satisfied that the terms 
were beneficial to him. T o shew in detail how the legal 
position of the Infant has been modified by the 
numerous Statutes which regulate the contractual bond 
between master and servant, would almost mean g iv ing 
an abstract of these lengthy enactments. Suffice it to 
say that if the contract with the employer is on the whole 
to his advantage, the minor is concerned wi th nearly as 
huge body of Statutory legislation as is an adult 
employee, and has also Statutory advantages peculiarly 
his own, e.g., The Factory and Workshop Acts, 1878 
to 1895. The Coal Mines Regulation Acts, 1887 to 
r 896, take him under their protection normally as an 
adult, and abnormally as a " child " or " young person." 
The Shop Hours Acts, 1892 to 1895 vitiate any con-
tract which a male or female Infant under 18 enters 
into, which contains terms contrary to the provisions of 
these Acts. 
T o briefly illustrate these statements we draw a 
few leading particulars f rom the Statutes regulating 
mining and factory l ife. 
By the Acts (1887—1896) regulating employment 
in coal mines, the conditions under which young people 
may be employed (to the extent of which conditions 
their contractual freedom is of course affected), are as 
fol lows:—Boys between the ages of 12 and 16 may 
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not be employed below ground for more than 10 hours 
in any day, or 54 in any week. Above ground no boy 
or g i r l under 12 years of age may be employed at a l l ; 
between 12 and 13 the hours are l imited ; f rom 13 to 
16 they may be 54 per week, but on Saturday afternoon 
or Sunday their work is forbidden. N o boy or g i r l 
may be employed more than five hours continuously 
without an interval for meals. (See 50 and 51 Vict . , 
c. 58, sees. 4, 5, and 7.) 
T h e conditions of an Infant's employment in 
Factories and Workshops are also studiously regulated 
by modern legislation. A t the age of 18 both males 
and females cease to be " y o u n g persons," and certain 
provisions for their welfare then cease to be applicable 
and to a corresponding extent their freedom of contract 
wi th the employer is less cribbed, cabined, and confined. 
But now the female " y o u n g person" becomes a 
" woman," and is, under the Factory Acts, surrounded 
by a legal environment peculiar to such a personality. 
O n the other hand the male is now an adult workman 
in the eye of these particular Acts, but in the larger 
field of vision stretched out before the general law he is 
under contractual disabilities equally wi th other infants 
for three more years. (See Factory Acts, 1878, 1883, 
1891, 1895.) 
A n Infant has the same rights as an adult under 
the Employers Liab i l i ty Act , 1880 (43 and 44 V i c t , 
c. 42), and the Workmen's Compensation Act , 1897 
(60 and 61 Vict . , 37). 
36 
By the Naval Enlistment Act , 1884 (47 and 48 
Vict . , c. 46), a minor of 18 may bind himself to serve 
in the Navy for a period not exceeding 12 years for 
continuous and general service; i f under 18, he may 
be bound for a period not exceeding the time required 
for h im to attain the age of 30. 
The enlistment for service of soldiers in the army 
is regulated by the A r m y Act, 1881 (44 and 45 V i c t , 
c. 58). By section L X X V L , the period must not exceed 
12 years. Minors may be enlisted notwithstanding that 
enlistment is in the nature of a contract. I n R. v. 
Rotherfield Greys, 1823, 1 Barn and Cress 345, i t was 
said that public policy requires that a minor should be 
at liberty to contract an engagement with the State. 
III.—Contracts of Apprenticeship. 
A n Infant apprentice is a person (male or female), 
who, when under age, voluntarily binds himself for a 
definite term to serve and learn from a master, who 
covenants to treat h im his trade or calling. For the 
purposes of this thesis we are only called upon to state 
(1) in what respects the contract of apprenticeship 
differs f rom the other classes under headings I . and I I , , 
and so jus t i fy its differentiation, and (2), the effect of 
Modern Statute L a w upon this special contract. 
F rom Francesco v. Barnum and Corn v. Matthews, 
recently quoted, we gather that the rule of law is, that 
taking all conditions together the contract, in order to 
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be valid, must be of a nature beneficial to the apprentice. 
So far the contract resembles the valid contract of 
service. But f rom the time of Gylbert v. Fletcher, 1627, 
Cro. (3) 179, i t has been a rule of law that no action 
can be brought against an infant apprentice on his 
covenant to serve. The Courts, however, wi l l not 
allow this rule to be abused. I n Walter v. Everard, 
1891, T . L . R. v i i . , 469, already referred to, the 
apprentice was sued for the balance of a premium 
secured by a bond. T h e decision illustrates a relation-
ship between the contract of apprenticeship and the 
contract for necessaries. T h e case was acknowledged 
to be peculiar, the defendant had property; and when 
the action was brought he was over 21 years o f age. 
The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to succeed on the implied contract for 
necessaries just as i f there was no bond. I n the course 
of his judgment Fry , L . J., said :— 
" The only case which had been relied upon for the defendant was 
that of " Gylbert v. Fletcher," in which it was held that an 
Infant could not be sued on a covenant in an indenture of 
apprenticeship to serve his master. The reasons for that 
decision were not given, but they were probably twofold. In 
early days a master had at Common Law a very large power of 
correcting and chastising his apprentices, and by very early 
Statutes power was given to Justices of the Peace to deal with 
recalcitrant apprentices, and it was probably felt that it was 
better to leave the master to his remedy against the apprentice, 
either in the domestic forum or before the Justice, rather than 
to allow him to sue him upon his covenant. The case, there-
fore, did not in any way affect tiy; law as to the liability of the 
Infant on a covenant to pay for his education." 
A n Infant can avoid the indenture the moment he 
comes o f age (Exp. Davies, 1784, 5 T . R., 715), but i f 
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he wishes to avoid he must do so within a reasonable 
time after attainment of majority. A master has no 
Common-Law right to dismiss his apprentice for ordin-
ary misconduct (Winstone v. Linn, 1823, 1 B. and C. 
4 6 0 ; Phillips v. Clift, 1859, 4 H . and N . 168). H e 
can only do so where the contract gives him the power 
to dismiss h im (Westwick v. Theodor, 1875, L . R. 10 
Q. B. 224). A master may, however, dismiss an 
apprentice who, in addition to continued unsatisfactory 
conduct, is an habitual thief (Learoyd v. Brook, 1891, 
T . L . R. v i i . , 237). 
T h e master is liable on his covenant to keep, teach, 
and maintain the Infant (Ellen v. Topp, 1851, 6 Ex. 
Rep. 424), but although 
" In an ordinary apprentice deed the covenants by the master are 
independent covenants, the performance of which does not 
depend upon the performance by the apprentice on his part of 
the obligations imposed him by the deed where an 
apprentice by his own wilful act prevents a master from 
teaching, the master can set this up as a defence when sued 
upon his covenant to keep, teach, and maintain the apprentice, 
whether the apprentice has performed his obligation under the 
deed or not . . . . The master has contracted to teach the 
apprentice how to carry on a pawnbroker's trade honestly. 
That must be the contract by the master. The apprentice, 
by becoming an habitual thief, has rendered this impossible." 
(Learoyd v. Brook, 1891.} 
* The master's power of corporal punishment still 
exists, but i f he use excessive violence or cruelty 
towards his apprentice, he wil l be liable to fine or 
imprisonment (24 and 25 V i c t , c. too. s. 26). The 
same enactment makes i t a misdemeanour if necessary 
food, clothing, or lodging are withheld from the 
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apprentice. By 38 and 39 V i c t , c. 86, s. 6, to these 
Statutory obligations of the master, which are repeated, 
medical aid is added. The penalty of fine or imprison-
ment is again imposed in case of serious injury 
through the master's default. I f the master become 
bankrupt the apprentice can avail himself of the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 and 47 V i c t , 
c. 52, s. 41, sub-sees. 1 and 2). 
The Employers and Workmen's Act, 1875 (38 and 
39 V i c t , c. 95), enacts, sec. 6 :— 
" In a proceeding before a Court of Summary jurisdiction in 
relation to a dispute under this Act between a master and an 
apprentice, the Court shall have the same powers as if the 
dispute were between an employer and a workman, and the 
master were the employer and the apprentice were the work-
man, and the instrument of apprenticeship a contract between 
an employer and a workman, and shall also have the following 
powers :— 
(1) It may make an order directing the apprentice to perform 
his duties under the apprenticeship ; and, 
(2) If it rescinds the instrument of apprenticeship it may, 
if it thinks it just so to do, order the whole or any part of the 
premium paid on the binding of the apprentice to be repaid. 
" Where an order is made directing an apprentice to perform his 
duties under the apprenticeship, the Court may from time to 
time, if satisfied after the expiration of not less than one month 
from the date of the order that the apprentice has failed to 
comply therewith, order him to be imprisoned for a period not 
exceeding 14 days. ' 
"Sec. 12.—This Act in so far as it relates to apprentices shall 
apply only to an apprentice to the business of a workman 
as denned by this Act upon whose binding either no premium 
is paid, or the premium (if any) paid does not exceed twenty-
five pounds, and to an apprentice bound under the provision 
of the Acts relating to the relief of the poor." 
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Apprentices have the same rights as normal 
persons under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 
(60 arid 61 Vict. , c. 37, s. 7, sub-sec. 2). 
I f an apprentice contract an engagement wi th the 
State by enlisting in the A r m y , the master may claim 
him, i f under 21, and bound by regular indenture for 
four years. H e must, however, carefully observe the 
procedure prescribed by the A r m y Act . (44 and 45 
V i c t , c. 58, sec. 96.) 
Sea Apprentices 
f rom the year 1703 (2 and 3 Anne, c. 6), have received 
Statutory treatment peculiar to themselves. The i r 
position, however, is now chiefly governed by that bulky 
example of codification, the Merchant Shipping Act , 
1894. Various special provisions are enacted as to their 
hiring, & c , sees. 105 to 112. The legal position of 
apprentices to the sea-fishing service is differentiated. 
Apprentices are not u seamen" within the meaning 
of the M . S. A. , J 894 (s. 742), but they are subject to 
the same discipline and liabilities, and enjoy the same 
rights and protection as regards their wages, property 
and service. The provisions of the Employers' and 
Workmen's Act , 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. , c. 90), have 
been applied to apprentices to the sea service since 
1880 (43 and 44 Vict. , c. 16, s. 11). 
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Fraud. 
W h e n fraud enters into an Infant's contract the 
legal aspect of his l iabi l i ty is to a degree changed. 
Equ i ty has for the most part dealt wi th the question 
which is l i t t le influenced (directly) by Statute law. W e 
make, however, the fol lowing quotation from Simpson, 
Infants, 2nd edi t , p. 101 and 102, quoting Exp. Jones 
18 Ch., D . 109. 
" Payment by trustees to an Infant who represented himself to be 
of age was held good ; so also a release given under similar 
circumstances, and a bond for an advance made to him. The 
equitable doctrine now prevails ; but it is doubtful whether 
since the I. R. A. an Infant can be adjudicated a bankrupt 
for a trading debt, even if he has expressly represented him-
self to the petitioning creditor as of full age " 
Torts arising from Contract 
" Where an Infant commits a wrong of which a 
contract, or the obtaining of something under a contract, 
is the occasion, but only the occasion, he is liable." 
(Pollock, Torts, 4th edit., p. 50). This doctrine is 
illustrated by Barnard v. Haggis (1863, 32 L . J. C. P.); 
and Burton v. Levey (1891, T . L . R. v i i . , 248). 
Modern legislation can only be said to have 
indirectly affected the Infant 's position here when by 
evil doing he was actually passed f rom the civi l to the 
criminal sphere. In the two cases quoted he may be 
said to have stayed on the boundary line. I n the 
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report of the latter case, The Queen z>. McDonald (15 
Q. B. D . 323) was referred to, where an Infant over 
14 years of age converted to his own use goods which 
had been delivered to him by the owner under an 
agreement for the hire of the same ; i t was held that 
he was r ightly convicted of larceny as a bailee of the 
goods under 24 and 25 V i c t , c. 96, sec. 3. 
Principal and Agent. 
The capacity of a person to enter into and incur 
l iabil i ty upon a contract of agency, whether as principal 
or agent, depends upon his general capacity to contract 
(Smally v. Smally, 1700, 1 Eq. , Ca. Abr . 6). A n 
Infant's contractual position, therefore, as principal or 
agent is affected by the Statutory regulations already 
mentioned, so far as they apply to the particular class 
of contract under review, and to the circumstances of 
any special agreement. But i t is an old legal principle 
that I nfants and others not sui generis, though their 
own contractual capacity is incomplete, can bind the 
principal for whom they act as agent. 


The Effect of Modern English 
Statute Law upon the Contractual 
Status of Married Women. 
Abbreviations.—M. W. P., 1870 = Married Women s 
Property Act, l8jo. 
M. W. P., 1874 = Married Women s Property 
Act, 1874. 
M. W. P., 1882 = Married Women s Property 
Act, 1882. 
M. W. P., 1893 = Married Women s Property 
Act, 1893. 
Macqueen — Rights, &c., of Husband and Wife> 
by J . F. Macqueen, 3rd edition, 1883. 
Ltish = Law of Husband and Wife, by Montague 
Lush, 2nd edition, 1896. 
Between 1870 and 1893, legislation to a large 
extent removed the contractual disabilities of married 
women which existed prior to the former date. T h e 
A c t of 1882 (45 and 46 V i c t , c. 75). may be called the 
Citadel Statute, by which the rights in personam of a 
feme covert are preserved, while three other Statutes 
which became law in 1870, 1874, and 1893 respectively, 
(33 and 34 V i c t , c. 93 ; 37 and 38 V i c t , c. 50 ; 56 and 
57 V i c t , c. 63), form its outworks. T h e armament o f 
the two former, however, superseded by the heavier 
A 
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guns of the citadel, are now only useful in a very 
limited area, but the last named Act is an important 
supplement to the central enactment. Previous to the 
date of the earliest of this group of Statutes, the 
married woman's contractual position was regulated 
chiefly by the Common Law, tempered at times by the 
gentler influence of Equity. The year 1870 will there-
fore be taken as a time division. We will then 
endeavour to present briefly but clearly the contractual 
status of a feme covert prior to the operation of the 
M. W. P., 1870. The successive legal effects wrought 
by this and the three following M. W. P. Acts will be 
traced and illustrated. We will also note in the proper 
place, modifications in the legal position brought about 
by other Statutes. The contracts of divorced women, 
and women judically separated from their husbands, 
will be considered by way of appendix to the main 
thesis. 
Before 1870, a married woman was emphatically 
an "abnormal" person as regarded her contractual 
rights and liabilities. There were, however, some 
exceptional cases. 
( 1 ) The wife of the King of England is of 
capacity to grant and to take, sue and be sued as a 
feme sole, at the Common Law. (Co. Litt., / J J A.) 
(2 ) Under the old law the wife of a man civiliter 
mortuus was, if a trader, liable to bankruptcy (Exp. 
Franks, 7 Bing. 762; also Sparrow v. Carruthers cited 
in Lean v. Schutz, 1778, 2 Black W., 1197). The civil 
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death which arose by taking monastic vows or by 
abjuring the realm, has of course, long since departed. 
A man might, however, have been civiliter mortuus by 
conviction and attainder for treason and felony, up to 
the date of the Forfeitures Act (33 and 34 Vict., c. 23, 
s. 1), which coincided with the operation of the M. W. 
P., 1870. Civil death can now arise only from outlawry. 
The contractual position of the wife of a man now 
civiliter mortuus would probably be placed on a more 
comprehensive basis by reason of the operation of the 
M . W. P. Acts. I t is possible in this respect she might 
even be in the eye of the law a feme sole. 
( 3 ) The custom of the City of London enabled 
a married woman to trade, and for that purpose to 
make valid contracts. She could not bring or defend 
an action upon these unless her husband was joined 
with her as a party, but she did not thereby involve 
him in her trading liabilities (Anson, p. 121). 
The custom as translated from the Liber Albus in 
the Town Clerk's office, is as follows : — 
" Where a feme covert of the husband useth any craft in the said 
City on her sole account whereof the husband meddleth 
nothing, such a woman shall be charged as a feme sole 
concerning everything that toucheth the craft, and if the 
husband and wife be impleaded, in such case the wife shall 
plead as a feme sole, and if she be condemned, she shall be 
committed to prison till she have made satisfaction, and the 
husband and his goods shall not in such case be charged nor 
impeached." 
Upon this custom, Mr. Roper says :— 
*k The trade must be carried on within the City, and on the wife's 
sole account, it seems, therefore, that if by any means it can 
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be proved that her husband had any concern in it, the case 
will not be protected by the custom. The husband's inter-
meddling is expressly provided against by the custom. He 
may, however, determine his wife's trading in future, but he 
cannot do so in retrospect, neither can he do any act to injure 
her creditors, who are entitled to be satisfied out of her 
property in trade; but after those demands are satisfied, he 
may, as it would seem, by law, possess himself of the surplus 
of her property; for custom does not extend to this point, it 
regarding only trade and commerce." (Macqueen, p. 334.) 
( 4 ) Before 1870, in fact up to the date of the 
M . W . P., 1882, becoming operative, a feme sole had 
certain proprietory rights wi th regard to her choses in 
action when not held for her separate use. I n Pur dew 
v. Jackson, 1823 (1 Russ., 1), Sir Thomas Plumer thus 
states the law on the subject :— 
" Marriage is only a qualified gift to the husband of the wife's 
choses in action upon condition that he reduce them into 
possession during its continuance. The wife's right is not 
divested by the marriage. The chose in action continues to 
belong to her; so that, if the husband happen to die before 
his wife, she, and not his personal representatives will be 
entitled to it. The husband, therefore, acquires no right to 
his wife's chose in action. Reduction into possession is a 
necessary and indispensable preliminary to his having any 
right of property in himself, or to his being able to convey 
any right of property to another. I f he does not perform this 
condition in his life-time, the right of his widow after his death 
continues unaltered, exactly as if she had never married." 
Choses in action consist generally of personal 
property recoverable by action, e.g., debts, money on 
deposit, possibly balance of a current account, arrears 
of rent, legacies, residuary personal estate, trust 
funds, &c. Formerly i t was considered that negotiable 
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instruments were choses in possession to which the 
husband was entitled jure mariti (McNeilage v. Hollo-
way, 1818, 1 Bam. and A i d . 218), because the husband 
might endorse his wife's negotiable instruments ; but 
this doctrine has not prevailed (Sherrington v. Yates, 
1844, 1 2 Mee. and W. , 855). 
I n this k ind of property, therefore, the husband 
had but an inchoate interest which could only be made 
absolute by reducing res in posse to res in esse. 
Marriage did not divest choses in action out of the 
wife, but the husband acquired by marriage a right to 
reduce them into possession. I t is obvious that a 
feme covert could not make a valid contract regarding 
this species of property while her husband possessed 
these legal powers. 
T h e chose in action, however, might be of such a 
nature as not to admit of immediate reduction into 
possession, for example, where it consists of a rever-
sionary interest in a trust fund. The nature of the 
t i t le the husband could make under this condition is 
thus expressed in L o r d Lyndhurst 's judgment in 
Howner v. Morton, 1825 (3 Russ., 65 ) :— 
" I f at the time of the assignment he is in a condition to reduce 
the chose in action into possession, the assignment operates 
immediately. I f he is afterwards in a condition to reduce the 
thing into possession, the assignment will then have full effect; 
but if he dies before the event happens on which the chose in 
action may be reduced into possession, the assignment 
becomes altogether inoperative." 
These words expressing the old law accurately, 
which we submit, is the case, i t is obvious that i f the 
reversion could not possibly rest in possession until after 
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the husband's death, no alienation by the husband could 
defeat the wife's title by survivorship. Regarding 
reversionary choses in action which fall into possession 
during the lifetime of the husband, i t is apparent at 
once that the wife's contractual position is the same as 
in the case of possessory choses in action. Reversion-
ary personalty so conditioned as to absolutely bar the 
husband's legal touch would seem to be of a differ ing 
order, but the Courts have r igidly prevented not only 
the husband, but husband and wife acting jo in t ly and 
amicably f rom assigning such personalty. (See Wade 
v. Saunders, 1824, Taun and Russ., 306 ; Whittle v. 
Henning, 2 Ph., 731 ; Box v. Box, 1 Drury, 42 ; an 
appointment however, by a feme covert of reversionary 
personalty in exercise of a power given by a settlement 
drawn up in accordance with an ante-nuptial verbal 
agreement, held to be confirmed by the wife's conduct, 
is valid. Greenhill v. North British and Mercantile 
Insurance Co., 1893, L . T . 69, 526.) The contractual 
power of the wife was therefore nil with regard to 
every species of choses in action, unti l the operation of 
the Statute about to be mentioned. 
I n 1857 an Ac t was passed (20 and 21 Vict . , c. 57), 
commonly called Malin's Act , which enacted :— 
"Sec. 1.—After the 31st day of December, 1857, it shall be lawful 
for every married woman by deed to dispose of every future 
or reversionary interest, whether vested or contingent, of such 
married woman, or her husband in her right, in any personal 
estate whatsoever to which she shall be entitled under any 
instrument made after the said 31st day of December, 1857 
(except such a settlement as after mentioned), and also to 
release or extinguish any power which may be vested in or 
limited or reserved to her in regard to any such personal estate, 
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as fully and effectually as she could do if she were a feme sole, 
and also to release and extinguish her right or equity to a 
settlement out of any personal estate to which she, or her 
husband in her right, may be entitled in possession under any 
such instrument as aforesaid, save and except that no such 
disposition, release, or extinguishment shall be valid unless 
the husband concur in the deed by which the same shall be 
effected, nor unless the deed be acknowledged by her as 
hereinafter directed: Provided always that nothing herein 
contained shall extend to any reversionary interest to which 
she shall become entitled by virtue of any deed, will, or 
instrument by which she shall be restrained from alienating or 
affecting the same." 
" Sec. 2.—Every deed to be executed in England or Wales by a 
married woman for any of the purposes of this Act shall be 
acknowledged by her, in the manner prescribed by 3 and 4 
Will. 4, c. 74; and every deed to be executed in Ireland by a 
married woman for any of the purposes of this Act shall be 
acknowledged by her in the manner prescribed by 4 and 5 
Will. 4, c. 92 ; and all and singular the clauses and provisions 
in the said Acts concerning the disposition of lands by 
married women, including the provisions for dispensing with 
the concurrence of the husbands of married women, in the 
cases in the said Acts mentioned, shall extend and be applicable 
to such interests in personal estate and to such powers as may 
be disposed of, released, or extinguished by virtue of this Act, 
as fully and effectually as if such interests or powers were 
interests in or powers over land." 
I t follows, we submit, that f r om the time this 
enactment began to operate a married woman might, 
and still may, deal w i th her reversionary personalty by 
a contract made by deed, acknowledged by her, and 
concurred in by her husband. I t may be thought that 
considering the scope of this thesis we have dealt 
somewhat ful ly wi th legal positions which are rapidly 
losing importance, but to women married before 
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January ist, 1883, whose r ight to a chose in action has 
accrued before that date, the law as stated still applies. 
The two earlier M . W . P. Acts do not affect this kind 
of interest, but a great change has been wrought by 
the M . W . P., 1882. Section 24 of that Statute 
states : — " The word 1 property ' in this Act includes a 
th ing in action." This gives a married woman the 
same extensive rights over her choses in action as she 
receives over her property generally by the same Act . 
The fol lowing section (25) enacts : — " T h e date of the 
commencement of this Ac t shall be the first of January, 
one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three." 
The powers of contracting allowed by the law to 
married women, and which we have hitherto considered 
are quite of an exceptional and partial nature either as 
to the person, or the subject matter, and do not affect 
the bulk of English matrons. Before 1870, what was 
the normal legal position of a feme covert as regards :— 
A . —Contracts entered into before 
marriage. 
B. —Contracts with reference to her 
separate Estate. 
c. —Contracts as Agent. 
D. —Contracts with Husband. 
H o w has contractual status in these four respects 
been affected by legislation subsequent to 1870? W e 
wil l endeavour to answer this question in some detail. 
First as to contracts under A . 
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Under the old law, to use the words o f Blackstone, 
the husband / ' adopted his wife and her circumstances 
together" (Comms. Bk. i , c. 15). " A d o p t i n g her 
circumstances " was equivalent to becoming subject to 
her debts, and being responsible for her previous 
contracts. H e was not, however, in strict contempla-
t ion of law personally liable for them. He was liable 
to be sued in respect o f them jo in t ly wi th her simply 
because she could not be sued alone, on account of the 
disabili ty to which marriage subjected her. H e could 
not be sued alone; and upon his wife's death, unless 
judgment had been previously recovered against them, 
he became freed f rom liabil i ty, except that, as 
administrator he was liable to the extent of the assets 
which he became possessed of i n that capacity (Lush, 
p . 271-2). T h e bankruptcy and discharge of the 
husband after action brought against both jo in t ly for 
the wife's ante-nuptial obligations discharged both at 
law of their l iabi l i ty ; but, i t seems, the wife's separate 
estate could in equity be reached to satisfy such 
obligations (Chubb v. Stretch, 1870, L . R. 9, E q . 555). 
Said Lindley, L . J., in Beck v. Pierce, . 1889 (23 
Q. B . D. , 320) :— 
"At Common Law the husband was liable for his wife's ante-
nuptial bebts to the whole extent of his property, whether he 
knew of their existence or not, and whether he obtained any 
property from his wife or not, but he could not be sued alone 
for such debts if his wife were alive, and he could not be sued 
at all for them after her death." 
W e submit that the terms o f this judgment might 
be applied generally to the contractual l iabil i ty of a 
feme covert incurred before her marriage. 
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Such, very briefly, was the law previous to the 
year, 1870. I n considering the changes made by recent 
legislation it is necessary to remember that none of the 
M . W . P. Acts are retrospective. W i t h regard to 
ante-nuptial liability, the legal position of the parties 
married is regulated by the Common or Statute Law 
in force at the date of the marriage. Consequently 
to persons whose marriage took place before August 
9th, 1870 (the date of the operation of the M . W . P., 
1870), the Common Law applies ; where the marriage 
was on, or subsequent to that date, and prior to July 
30th, 1874 (the date of the operation of the M . W . P., 
1874), the respective rights and liabilities come under 
the 1870 A c t ; and the position similarly changes in the 
case of marriages between the respective dates when 
the M . W . P., 1874, and the M . W . P., 1882, came into 
force. The first two Acts in fact "are" and "are not." 
They are repealed, and yet they affect and control 
present legal relations. Sec. 22 of the M . W . P., 1882, 
enacts:— 
"The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, and the Married 
Women's Property Act, 1870, Amendment Act, 1874, are 
hereby repealed : Provided that such repeal shall not affect 
any act done or right acquired while either of such Acts was 
in force, or any right or liability of any husband or wife, 
married before the commencement of this Act, to sue or be 
sued under the provisions of the said repealed Acts or either 
of them, for or in respect of any debt, contract, wrong, or 
other matter or thing whatsoever, for or in respect of which 
any such right or liability shall have accrued to or against 
such husband or wife before the commencement of this Act." 
The only ante-nuptial liabilities wi th which the 
M . W . P., 1870, dealt with were debts. Debts, however, 
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are frequently founded on contract, we must therefore 
briefly make mention of the effects of this Act. From 
the wife's ante-nuptial debts the husband was relieved 
altogether, and i t was enacted by sec. 12 that the wife 
alone should be liable to be sued for, and any separate 
estate belonging to her should be liable to satisfy, such 
debts as though she had continued unmarried. T h e 
wife might be sued alone (Williams v. Merrier, 1882, 
9 Q. B. D . , 337), and the plaint iff might recover j udg -
ment without proving that the defendant had separate 
estate (Doivne v. Fletcher, 1888, 21 Q. B. D. , 11); but 
the married woman was not made personally liable on 
the judgment, the creditor's only remedy being an 
equitable remedy against her separate estate (Exp. 
Jones, 1879, 1 2 Ch., D . 484); but this was liable though 
subject to restraint on anticipation. 
" I n 1871 the question arose before Lord Romilly whether this 
(Sec. 12 of the Act) applied to separate property of the wife's 
as to which there was a 1 restraint against anticipation,' which 
ordinarily protected it from creditors, and it was urged that 
this had not been intended. Lord Romilly held that it did, 
and said :— 11 am sure that the question did not escape the 
attention of Parliament. I have a distinct recollection that 
this effect of the enactment was intended, for the whole Act 
was under discussion, and it was said to be only reasonable 
that, as the liability of the husband was taken away, the 
liability should be laid on the whole property of the wife. At 
all events, that is the true construction of the Act, and the 
enactment extends to the property of a married woman though 
it is subject to a restraint against anticipation.' (Quoted from 
" Times" Law Report of Axfordv. Reid, 1889, v. 214, which 
case supports the principle Lord Romilly lays down.") 
A s has been stated the M . W . P., 1870, seems 
only to deal wi th ante-nuptial debts, including, of course, 
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debts arising f rom contract. Apparently it does not 
affect the liabili ty of the parties in respect of a breach 
of contract made by the wife before her marriage, and 
f rom which breach a debt has not arisen (Lush, 273-4). 
Under it the husband must still bear the burden o f 
ante-nuptial breaches of contract by his wife f rom which 
debts have not arisen. 
Some anomalies came quickly to l ight after the 
1870 Ac t began to operate. A husband who had 
become possessed of property of the wife jure ntariti, 
was in respect of her ante-nuptial debts, irresponsible 
absolutely. A settlement made bond fide wi th the 
object of protecting the wife against an extravagant 
husband had no force against her creditors. Th i s 
anomaly survived unti l January ist, 1883. 
The M . W . P., 1874, repealed so much of the A c t 
of 1870 as enacted that a husband should not be liable 
for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage, 
and provided (sec. 1) that husband and wife might be 
jo in t l y sued for any debt contracted, or for any tort 
committed, by the wife before marriage, or for the 
breaches of any contract made by the wife before 
marriage, and that the husband should be liable (sec. 2) 
in respect of such matter to the extent of the fol lowing 
assets :— 
(1.) "The value of the personal estate in possession of the wife, 
which shall have vested in the husband. 
(2.) The value of the choses in action of the wife which the 
husband shall have reduced into possession, or with reasonable 
diligence might have reduced into possession. 
(3.) The value of the chattels real of the wife which shall have 
vested in the husband and wife. 
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(4.) The value of the rents and profits of the real estate of the 
wife which the husband shall have received, or with reasonable 
diligence might have received. 
(5.) The value of the husband's estate or interest in any property, 
real or personal, which the wife, in contemplation of her 
marriage with him, shall have transferred to him or to any 
other person. 
(6.) The value of any property, real or personal, which the wife, in 
contemplation of her marriage with the husband, shall, with 
his consent, have transferred to any person with the view of 
defeating or delaying her existing creditors. (Sec. 5.)" 
I t was provided (sec. 5) that when the husband 
after marriage paid any debt of his wife, or had a 
judgment bond fide recovered against h im in any such 
action as in this A c t mentioned, then to the extent o f 
such payment or judgment the husband should not in 
any subsequent action be liable. By sec. 2 the husband 
was enabled in addition to other pleas, to plead that he 
was not liable in respect of assets. I f he did not thus 
plead he was taken to have confessed liability as far as 
assets were concerned. I f i t was not found that the 
husband had assets, he was entitled to judgment wi th 
costs, whatever were the result of the action against the 
wife (sec. 3), When the l iabil i ty of the husband was 
established the judgment was a j o in t judgment against 
husband and wife to the extent of this liability, and a 
separate judgment against the wife for the residue o f 
the debt or damages (sec. 4). I n the case of an action 
against the husband and wife jo in t ly , where the husband 
is found not liable in respect of any such assets as are 
mentioned in the Act , the plaint i f f wi l l be allowed to 
add the costs of the husband's defence to his own, and 
recover both against the wife. Thus in London and 
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Provincial Bank v. Bogle (7 Ch., D . 773), the husband, 
in an action by the Bank against himself and his wife 
for debts contracted previously to marriage, pleaded that 
he had not, and never had, at the time or since his 
marriage any assets in respect of which he was liable 
for such debts of his wife. Judgment was entered for 
him, wi th costs, but against his wife ; and the Bank 
were held entitled to add his costs to their original 
debt, and recover the whole against the separate estate 
of the wife. 
I t has also been held under this Statute, that an 
Englishman married in England to a woman who had 
contracted debts in a foreign country where she resided 
prior to the marriage, is liable in England only to the 
extent of assets derived f rom his wife (De Greuchy v. 
Wills and Wife, 4 C. P. D . , 362 ; See Macqueen, 
P- 7S-6). 
A s under the Ac t of 1870, so under this Act , i t 
was unnecessary to prove the existence of separate 
estate, either at the time when judgment was recovered, 
or when the action was commenced (Downe v. Fletcher^ 
1888, 21 Q. B. D. , 11), and the l iabil i ty on the judg-
ment against her was not a personal but only a 
proprietary liability, and the judgment could only affect 
her separate estate, though that was liable whether free 
or subject to restraint on anticipation (Downe v. 
Fletchery 1888 ; Axford v. Reid, 1889; Scott v. Morley, 
1887, 20 Q. B. D. , 120). 
Sec. 1 of the 1874 A c t rendered it necessary that 
the husband and wife should be sued joint ly, and gave 
no power to sue the husband alone. Consequently i f 
the wife died before action was brought the husband 
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escaped liabili ty, even though he were possessed of 
assets sufficient for the discharge of the debt (Bell v. 
Stocker, 1882, 10 Q. B. D . , 129). 
I t has been held under this Act , that if a woman 
possessed of shares in a joint-stock company, marries, 
and the shares are settled upon her marriage to her 
separate use, the husband is liable, upon the company 
being subsequently wound up, to be placed on the 
register as contributory in his own right under 78th 
Section of the Companies Act , 1862 ; and that his 
l iabi l i ty is not l imited by the 1874 Statute to the assets 
therein specified. Lush, p. 2j8, quoting Re West of 
England Bank, Exp. Hatcher, 12 Ch., D . 284.) 
The Section referred to is as follows :— 
" I f any female contributory marries, either before or after she has 
been placed on the list of contributories, her husband shall, 
during the continuance of the marriage, be liable to contribute 
the same sum as she would have been liable to contribute if 
she had not married; and he shall be deemed to be a 
contributory accordingly." 
A s before stated, the M . W . P., 1882, repealed the 
Acts of 1870 and 1874, except as to rights and liabilities 
acquired and incurred under them. Three sections 
have particular reference to ante-nuptial liabilities, 
viz. : sections 13, 14, and 15, which we give in fu l l . 
13. "A woman after her marriage shall continue to be liable in 
respect and to the extent of her separate property for all 
debts contracted, and all contracts entered into or wrongs 
committed by her before her marriage, including any sums for 
which she may be liable as a contributory, either before or 
after she has been placed on the list of contributories, under 
and by virtue of the Acts relating to joint-stock companies; 
and she may be sued for any such debt and for any liability 
in damages or otherwise under any such contract, or in respect 
of any such wrong; and all sums recovered against her in 
respect thereof, or for any costs relating thereto, shall be 
payable out of her separate property; and, as between her 
and her husband, unless there be any contract between them 
to the contrary, her separate property shall be deemed to be 
primarily liable for all such debts, contracts, or wrongs, and 
for all damages or costs recovered in respect thereof: 
Provided always, that nothing in this Act shall operate to 
increase or diminish the liability of any woman married 
before the commencement of this Act, for any such debt, 
contract, or wrong, as aforesaid, except as to any separate 
property to which she may become entitled by virtue of this 
Act, and to which she would not have been entitled for her 
separate use under the Acts hereby repealed or otherwise, if 
this Act had not passed. 
A husband shall be liable for the debts of his wife 
contracted, and for all contracts entered into and wrongs 
committed by her, before marriage, including any liabilities to 
which she may be so subject under the Acts relating to joint-
stock companies as aforesaid, to the extent of all property 
whatsoever belonging to his wife which he shall have acquired 
or become entitled to from or through his wife, after deduct-
ing therefrom any payments made by him, and any sums for 
which judgment may have been bond fide recovered against 
him in any proceeding at law, in respect of any such debts, 
contracts, or wrongs for or in respect of which his wife was 
liable before her marriage as aforesaid; but he shall not be 
liable for the same any further or otherwise; and any court in 
which a husband shall be sued for any such debt shall have 
power to direct any inquiry or proceedings which it may think 
proper for the purpose of ascertaining the nature, amount, or 
value of such property: Provided always, that nothing in this 
Act contained shall operate to increase or diminish the 
liability of any husband married before the commencement of 
this Act, for or in respect of any such debt or other liability 
of his wife as aforesaid. 
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IS- A husband and wife may be jointly sued in respect of any 
such debt or other liability (whether by contract or for any 
wrong) contracted or incurred by the wife before marriage as 
aforesaid, if the plaintiff in the action shall seek to establish 
his claim, either wholly or in part, against both of them ; and 
if in any such action, or in any action brought in respect of 
any such debt or liability against the husband alone, it is not 
found that the husband is liable in respect of any property of 
the wife so acquired by him or to which he shall have become 
so entitled as aforesaid, he shall have judgment for his costs 
of defence, whatever may be the result of the action against 
the wife if jointly sued with him; and in any such action 
against husband and wife jointly, if it appears that the husband 
is liable for the debt or damages recovered, or any part thereof, 
the judgment to the extent of the amount for which the 
husband is liable shall be a joint judgment against the 
husband personally and against the wife as to her separate 
property; and as to the residue, if any, of such debt and 
damages, the judgment shall be a separate judgment against 
the wife as to her separate property only." 
Under this Ac t therefore, a plaint iff 's remedy 
against a feme covert for her ante-nuptial liabilities 
(which include breach of contract), is threefold ( i . ) 
H e may sue the married woman herself (sec. 13). (2.) 
the husband (sec. 14). (3.) husband and wife jo in t ly 
(sec. 15). A n d he may sue the wife and the husband 
one after the other (Beck v. Pierce, 1889, 23 Q. B. D . , 
316), judgment against one being no bar to proceedings 
against the other (ibid). T h e plaint i f f may sue both 
joint ly , but in this case the judgments may be separate, 
or the judgment may be a jo in t judgment against the 
husband personally, and against the wife as to her 
separate property (ibid). A s between husband and 
wife the former is entitled to be indemnified out of the 
latter's separate property, for, subject to a contract w i th 
B 
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her husband her separate estate is primarily liable (ibid). 
I f sued alone, the husband cannot require the wife to 
be joined ; i f she is sued alone in respect of her 
separate estate, she cannot require her husband to be 
jo ined (ibid). T h e words " before marriage" in the 
Statute have received a liberal interpretation f rom the 
Courts. I n Jay v. Robinson, 1890 (25 Q. B. D. , 467), 
judgment for a sum of money was recovered against a 
married woman, who subsequently obtained a dissolution 
of her marriage and married again, and by settlement 
made by her on the second marriage, property belong-
ing to her was settled to her separate use without power 
of anticipation. The judgment debt was held to be a 
"debt contracted before her marriage" within the 
meaning of sec. 13; also i t was a "debt contracted 
before marriage" within the meaning of sec. 19, so 
that the restriction upon anticipation contained in the 
settlement had no validity against i t . A l l liabilities 
arising f rom breach of contract are, we submit, equally 
influenced by this judgment so far as a previous 
marriage is an element in the legal position. I n sees. 
13 and 7 the l iabi l i ty to which a feme covert was 
previously subject to under contracts arising f rom 
holding shares in a joint-stock company is placed on 
the same footing wi th her other liabilities. She may 
now be sued alone for any sums due f rom her as con-
tributory. T h e A c t removes the anomaly mentioned 
before, as to the separate property, bound by a restraint 
against anticipation, being liable in every case to the 
claims of the creditor. Sec. 19 provides that, with 
one exception therein stated, nothing in the Ac t shall 
affect any settlement, made before or after marriage, 
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respecting the property o f any married woman, or 
render inoperative any restriction against anticipation. 
A proviso is added to protect creditors against fraudu-
lent settlements :— 
" No restriction against anticipation contained in any settlement or 
agreement for a settlement of a "woman's own property to be 
made or entered into by herself shall have any validity against 
debts contracted by her before marriage, and no settlement or 
agreement for a settlement shall have any greater force or 
validity against creditors of such woman than a like settlement 
or agreement for a settlement made or entered into by a man 
would have against his creditors." 
I t would seem, therefore, that now a restraint i f 
imposed by a stranger in a marriage settlement or 
articles, is good against all the wife's ante-nuptial 
liabilities, and i f imposed by the wife herself is void as 
against ante-nuptial creditors. The former restriction 
was disallowed, as we have seen, in cases decided under 
the Acts of 1870 and 1874. I t is a question whether 
the latter part of sec. 19 applies to ante-nuptial liabilities 
outside " debts " which are alone specifically mentioned, 
and the question is the more acute i f the settlement 
were made for valuable consideration (seeLusA, p. 256). 
T h e Statute only contemplates actions being brought 
against the wife by strangers. A husband cannot 
proceed against his wife to recover money which he 
had lent her before marriage (Butler v, Btdler, 1885, 
14 Q. B. D. , 831). Th i s view is, however, accepted 
wi th hesitation by M r . Lush (p. 396, note (d). 
Although the words o f sec. 13 o f the Ac t are " i n 
respect and to the extent of her separate estate," i t was 
laid down in a recent case that even i f coverture be 
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pleaded, it is not impossible for an ante-nuptial creditor 
to obtain a personal judgment for his debt, and not 
merely a judgment enforceable out of the married 
woman's separate property. (Robinson v. Lynes, 1894, 
71 L. T. 24.) This decision is, however, not considered 
to be final (Lush. p. 176). In fact it is contrary to the 
tenor of judicial decisions generally which relate to the 
Act, which almost without exception declare the liability 
to be proprietary only. 
A plaintiff, if he wish, may pass by the feme covert 
and (sec. 14) proceed against the husband alone in 
respect of the wife's ante-nuptial debts or breaches of 
contract. We have already seen that.the liability on 
the part of the husband is entirely independent of his 
wife's (Beck v. Pierce, as before). In the same case it 
is laid down that as regards this liability, the Statute of 
Limitations begins to run, not from the date of the 
marriage, but from the first accrual of the cause of 
action against the wife. The extent of the husband's 
liability is not set out elaborately as in the 1874 Act, but 
though it is really made more comprehensive de verba* it 
is narrowed de facto by the operation of the Statute. 
The liability is co-extensive with the amount of property 
belonging to the wife, which the husband shall at any 
time have acquired or become entitled to from or 
through her. Inasmuch, however, as every woman 
married after the commencement of the operation of 
the Act, is entitled to hold as her separate property, all 
real and personal property which shall belong to her at 
the time of marriage, or shall be acquired by or devolve 
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upon her after marriage, it follows that the amount of 
property, which a husband may acquire from or through 
his wife is limited to what he obtains by gift or settle-
ment, or estate by the curtesy. Moreover, before the 
plaintiff can obtain a verdict, he must allow the 
defendant to deduct from such assets as are available 
(a) the amount of any payment made by him, and (b) 
any sums for which judgment may have been bond fide 
recovered against him, in respect of any such ante-
nuptial debts and contracts. The Court has also power 
to direct any enquiry it may think fit as provided in 
sec. 14. We have seen that by the M. W. P., 1874, 
the husband was legally responsible for his wife's 
liability as a contributory under the Companies Act, 
1862, and that this responsibility was not limited to the 
extent of the assets received from her. I t is submitted 
that since 1882 he is only liable to the extent of such 
property as he may have acquired from or through his 
wife. In short, under this section, the remedy against 
the husband is in the nature of a right in rem, and 
apparently continues, so long as there are any assets as 
before mentioned, in his possession or under his control, 
irrespective of the fact whether the wife is alive or not. 
(Bellv. Stocker, 1882, 10 Q. B. D., 129.) Under the Act 
of 1874, the husband's liability departed with the wife. 
The manner of judgment against husband and 
wife when both are sued jointly has already been 
mentioned. 
We have already seen that under sec. 19 of the 
M. W. P., 1882, that no settlement or agreement for a 
settlement made before marriage respecting the 
property of any married woman is rendered inopera-
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tive by the Act, unless it be made by the feme covert 
herself in order to cheat her ante-nuptial creditors. 
Sec. 5 of the same Act reads as follows :— 
" Every woman married before the commencement of this Act 
shall be entitled to have and to hold and to dispose of in 
manner aforesaid as her separate property all real and personal 
property, her title to which, whether vested or contingent, and 
whether in possession, reversion, or remainder, shall accrue 
after the commencement of this Act, including any wages, 
earnings, money, and property so gained or acquired by her 
as aforesaid." 
We consider now ante-nuptial settlements. 
These two sections have been considered difficult 
to reconcile. A marriage settlement made in 1862, 
contained a covenant for the settlement of the after-
acquired property of the wife, from which interests 
settled or limited to her separate use and disposal were 
excluded. The wife became entitled under the Will of 
her mother, who died January 14th, 1883, to her 
residuary personal estate. I t was held by Pearson, J., 
that the effect of sec. 19 was to exclude the operation of 
sec. 5, and that the residuary personal estate so acquired 
by the wife was bound by the covenant, and was not 
separate property within the exception contained in the 
covenant. (Re Stonors 1883 Trusts, 24 Ch., D. 195.) 
Hancock v. Hancock, 1888 (38 Ch., D. 78) is to the same 
effect. (See Lush, p. 482-5.) In fact, settlements 
made before the Act were made on the footing that 
the Act had not been passed. Consequently sec. 5 
forms no part of such settlements, and to impart its 
operation would be to interfere with or affect the 
settlement. Property, therefore, belonging to a woman 
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who is a party to a settlement under such circum-
stances, is bound by her covenant. (See Lush, p. 486.) 
With regard to an ante-nuptial settlement where 
one or both of the parties are under age, we would 
refer to what we have said in Part I . of this thesis, 
p. 19-21. I t is also necessary to mention that in this 
as in other contracts, if one of the parties is of age, the 
infant party may avoid the provisions, but the adult is 
bound, provided there is no fraud practised by the 
infant (Lush, p. 502-3, and cases there cited). 
By sec. 24 of the M. W. P. Act, 1882, the word 
44 contract " includes :— 
" The acceptance of any trust, or of the office of executrix or 
administratrix, and the provisions of this Act as to liabilities 
of married women shall extend to all liabilities by reason of 
any breach of trust or devastavit committed by any married 
woman being a trustee or executrix or administratrix either 
before or after her marriage, and her husband shall not be 
subject to such liabilities unless he has acted or intermeddled 
in the trust or administration." 
The provision in this section that he is not to be 
answerable unless (i.e., except so far as) he has inter-
meddled, seems to limit his liability to post-nuptial 
cases, for he could not intermeddle qua husband before 
marriage. The effect of the section appears to limit 
the scope of sec. 14, under which if a woman who is 
trustee or executrix wrongfully misappropriates trust 
property before her marriage, her husband would seem, 
to the extent of the property referred to in the section, 
to be liable as well as the wife. We are not aware of 
any case which illustrates the co-meaning of these two 
enactments. I f it be true that the later section limits 
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the operation of the earlier in the manner stated, the 
old Common Law decisions have been so far superseded. 
In Palmer v. Wakefield, 1841 (3 Beav. 227), where a 
woman when sole had committed a breach of trust, and 
the question was whether her after-taken husband should 
make good the loss sustained by the trust estate, Lord 
Langdale said :— 
" In this situation she married Mr. Wakefield, and it was by the 
marriage and by his assuming the liabilities to which she was 
subject, that he also, as I think, became liable to pay the 
money." 
As any separate property belonging to a married 
woman is made liable, under the several Acts, for her 
ante-nuptial debts, & c it is obvious that jewels, settled 
upon her marriage to her separate use, come within the 
liability (Williams v. Merrier, 1882, 9 Q. B. D., 337). 
While the husband succeeds to his wife's liabilities, 
to the extent to which he may become entitled to 
property from or through her, the wife continues free 
from any share in his liabilities whatever property she 
may have acquired from or through him. 
Contracts with reference to separate 
Estate. 
Before the M. W. P., 1882, began to operate, a 
married woman had not as a general rule and under 
ordinary circumstances any original capacity to contract 
as a feme sole. Neither the M. W. P., 1870, nor its 
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amending Statute four years later directly dealt with 
her power of contracting, though under these Statutes 
fresh separate estate was created, and she might 
contract so as to bind these Statutory additions. The 
development, however, of a married woman's con-
tractual power was but small under the 1870 Act. 
Speaking generally it may be said that previous 
to the passing of the 1882 Act, the legal position as to 
a married woman's separate estate is indicated by 
quotations from the judgments in two cases, viz.: (1.) 
Murray v. Bailee, 1834 (4 My. and K., 220). (2.) 
Ashworth v. Outram (5 C. D., 941). 
(1.) "That at law a feme covert cannot in any way be sued, even 
for necessaries is certain. Bind herself, or her husband, by 
speciality, she cannot; and although living with him, and not 
allowed necessaries, or apart from him, whether on an 
insufficient allowance or an unpaid allowance, she may so far 
bind him that those who furnish her with articles ,of 
subsistence may sue him; yet even in respect of these, she 
herself is free from all suit. This is her position of disability, 
or immunity at law; and this is now clearly settled. Her 
separate existence is not contemplated; it is merged by the 
coverture in that of her husband; and she is no more 
recognized than is the cestui que trust or the mortgagor, the 
legal estate, which is the only interest the law recognises, 
being in otheis. But in equity the case is wholly different. 
Her separate existence, both as regards her liabilities and her 
rights is here abundantly acknowledged : not indeed, that her 
person can be made liable, but her property may, and it may 
be reached through a suit instituted against herself and 
trustees." 
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(2.) "In former years Judges of what used to.be called 
the Common Law Courts of this realm delighted in applying 
rigidly and strictly a series of rules and maxims which their 
predecessors had delighted themselves in devising, although 
they did not always commend themselves to the apprehension 
of the million. Amongst these maxims was one by which a 
married woman was held incapable of taking a gift either from 
her husband or a stranger But the Court of Chancery 
(a very great Court in its day, although it has now ceased to 
exist), invented that blessed word and thing * the separate 
use of a married woman.'" 
With regard to this separate estate the Courts of 
Equity allowed to a certain extent the power of con-
tracting. The contract, however, was distinctly of an 
abnormal type. The Element of personal responsibility 
essential to a contract was wanting ; the only liability a 
married woman could ever incur in respect of her 
engagements was a proprietary liability, a liability 
affecting her particular property—a liability in rem as 
distinguished from a liability in personam ; it was her 
property not herself that was the debtor. Her separate 
estate was clothed with a kind of entity of its own, 
which the married woman could bind almost as an 
agent binds his principal. (Lush, p. 298, and cases 
there cited.) 
In Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 1881 (17 Ch., D. 454), 
Brett, L. J. said :— 
4 < It is not true that equity has recognized or invented a status of 
a married woman to make contracts; neither does it seem to 
me that equity has ever said that what is now called a contract 
is a binding contract upon a married woman. What equity 
seems to have done is this : it has recognized a settlement as 
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putting a married woman into the position of having what 
is called a separate estate, and has attached certain liabilities 
not to her but to that estate." 
I t appears, notwithstanding what has been said, 
that outside the 1882 Act a writ of ca. sa. might be 
issued against a feme covert, and she might be arrested 
under it. (Scott v. Mor ley, 1887.) 
Before a contract could be enforced against the 
separate estate it had to be made, either by express 
words or by implication of law, with reference to and 
to bind the separate estate, and it lay on the plaintiff to 
establish this (Murray v. Bailee, 1834), though as will 
be seen in the second judgment about to be quoted 
this onus was not always a heavy one. Extracts from 
two cases, viz.: (1.) Johnson v. Gallagher, 1861 (3 De 
G. F. and J., 494). (2.) Mrs. Matthewmans case, 
1866 (L. R., 3 Eq., 781), illustrate these principles. 
(1.) " I think [said Jenner, L . J . ] , that in order to bind the 
separate estate by a general engagement, it should appear that 
the engagement was made with reference to and upon the 
faith and credit of that estate; and whether that was so or 
not, is a question to be judged by the Court upon all the 
circumstances." 
(2.) " I f a married woman, having separate property, enters into a 
pecuniary engagement, whether by ordering goods or other-
wise, which (if she were a feme sole) would constitute her a 
debtor, and in entering into such engagements, she purports 
to contract, not for her husband, but for herself, and on 
the credit of her separate estate, and it was so intended 
by her, and so understood by the person with whom she was 
contracting, that constitutes an obligation for which the 
person with whom she contracts has the right to make her 
separate estate liable; and the question whether the obligation 
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was contracted in such manner must depend upon the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case. It clearly is not 
necessary that the contract should be in writing, because it is 
now admitted that if a married woman enters into a verbal 
contract expressly (or impliedly) making her separate estate 
liable, such contract would bind it; nor is it necessary that 
there should be any express reference made to the fact of 
there being such separate estate, for a bond or promissory 
note given by a married woman, without any mention of her 
separate estate, has long been held sufficient to make her 
separate estate liable. I f the circumstances are such as to 
lead to the conclusion that she was contracting, not for her 
husband, but for herself, in respect of her separate estate, that 
separate estate will be liable to satisfy the obligation." 
Only the separate estate of which she was 
possessed at the time of making the promise, or enter-
ing into the engagement could be reached by her 
creditor. I t was only because she had bound it that it 
was liable : and she could not bind what did not belong 
to her. Consequently if she had no separate estate to 
bind at the time she entered into the engagement it 
was immaterial that she subsequently acquired separate 
estate. On the same principle separate property ac-
quired by her subsequent to the date of a contract 
which bound her estate in being at the time it was 
made, was free from any liability in connexion with the 
contract. The locus classicus supporting this view 
seems to be the judgment of the Court in a case already 
quoted, which was decided only the year before the 
passing of the M. W. P., 1882. We mean Pike v. 
Fitzgibbon. In the course of his judgment, James, 
L. J., made use of the following language :— 
" It is said that a married woman having separate estate has not 
merely a power of contracting a debt to be paid out of that 
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separate estate, but having a separate estate, has acquired a 
sort of equitable status of capacity to contract debts, not in 
respect only of that separate estate, but in respect of any 
separate estate which she may thereafter in any way acquire. 
It is contended that because equity enables her having estate 
settled to her separate use, to charge that estate, and to 
contract debts payable out of it, therefore she is released 
altogether in the contemplation of equity from the disability 
of coverture, and is enabled in a Court of Equity to contract 
debts to be paid and satisfied out of any estate settled to her 
separate use which she may afterwards acquire, or, to carry 
the argument to its logical consequences, out of any property 
which may afterwards come to her. In my opinion there is 
no authority for that contention." 
The mere contract entered into by a feme covert did 
not in any way fetter the separate estate or prevent the 
married woman from parting with it freely (Johnson v. 
Gallagher, 1861 ; Hemingway v. Brail hwaite, 1889, 
61, L. T., 224). The contract only gave the creditor (1.) 
a right to a judgment declaring that the separate estate 
which at the date of the contract was, and at the date 
of the judgment remained, vested in the married woman 
as her separate estate, excluding any separate property 
which she was restrained from anticipating, was liable 
to satisfy the debt or engagement. (2.) The benefit of 
an enquiry as to what was the separate estate which the 
married woman had at the time of contracting the debt 
or engagement, and whether that separate estate or any 
part of it remained capable of being reached by the 
judgment and execution of the Court (Pike v. Fitzgibbon; 
Robinson v. Pickering, 1881, 16 Ch., D. 660). The 
creditor also had the right to the appointment of a 
receiver. (In re Peace and Waller, 1883, 24 Ch., D. 
405.) Separate property subject to a restraint on 
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anticipation could not be bound by a contract, nor 
could it be reached after the death of the husband to 
satisfy a contract or engagement made in his lifetime. 
(Pike v. Fitzgibbon.) 
A debtor's summons could not issue against a 
feme covert. (Exp. Jones, 1879, 12 Ch., D. 484.) In 
Hodgson v. Williamson, 1880 (15 Ch., D. 87), it was 
held that the Statute of Limitations had no application 
to these engagements, but the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in re Lady Hastings, 1887 (35 Ch., D. 94), 
appears to lay down a contrary doctrine. As this case 
deals with some of the legal positions already mentioned, 
we will quote at length the judgment of Cotton, L. J. 
The facts were as follows. In April, 1875, Mr. Heane, 
the second husband of Lady Hastings, paid to her 
separate account ^400, without taking any security in 
writing for the same. Lady Hastings died on 
December 30th, 1884, without having made any pay-
ment of interest or principal in respect of this ^400, or 
given any acknowledgment in writing of her liability to 
repay i t ; though evidence was given that she had 
verbally admitted that the ,£400 had been lent to her 
and agreed to repay it with interest at 5 per cent., out 
of her separate estate. Lady Hastings at the time of 
her death was possessed of separate estate, consisting 
of furniture and household effects, which would be 
available for payment of the ^400 if the claim could 
be established. In an action to administer her estate, 
Mr. Heane carried in a claim to rank as a creditor 
against her separate estate for ^ 400 and interest. The 
claim was disputed by the executors. Mr. Justice Kay 
held that assuming the ^400 paid by Mr. Heane in 
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1875, to have been a loan, there was no ground for 
saying that a simple contract debt contracted by a 
married woman should not be treated in equity as 
barred by analogy to the Statute of Limitations; and 
accordingly that this debt was barred, and the summons 
must be dismissed. Mr. Heane now appealed. 
" Lord Justice Cotton, after disposing of another question raised 
by the appeal, but not of any public interest, said that he 
would assume, though he did not decide the point, for counsel 
on behalf of the respondents had not been heard, that the 
loan was made by the appellant to his wife, the late Lady 
Hastings, in 1875, and that this advance of ^400 was never 
repaid up to the time of her death in December, 1884, and 
that there had been neither acknowledgment of the debt in 
writing nor any payment of interest. The question, then, was 
whether the claim by the appellant was barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. Mr. Justice Kay had decided, and in his 
Lordship's opinion rightly decided, that the Statute operated 
as a bar. What, according to the doctrine of Courts of 
Equity, was the position of married women with regard to 
their separate estate? As the debt on which the claim was 
made was contracted in 1875, the case was not governed by 
the provisions of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 
but by the general rules of equity as to separate estate. The 
doctrine of separate estate was created by Courts of Equity in 
favour of married women, who were allowed a protection 
which would not be annexed to the estate of a man. When 
a restraint on anticipation was imposed, a married woman was 
precluded from binding by her act property which belonged 
to her for her separate use. But where no restraint on 
anticipation had been imposed, the Court considered the 
married woman, so far as regarded that separate property, as 
being in the same position, as if she were a feme sole—that is 
to say, she was capable of entering into contracts which would 
bind her separate property just as if she were unmarried. 
Such contracts could not be enforced against her personally, 
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though they would bind her separate property. And after the 
claim had been established in an action by her creditor, an 
inquiry would be directed as to what separate estate she had 
at the time of contracting the debt, and the trustees would be 
directed to apply the property in their hands in satisfaction of 
the claim. Being, therefore, entitled to contract as regarded 
her separate property (not restrained from anticipation) just as 
if she were a feme sole, the only possible consequence was 
that the Statute of Limitations was applicable to the contracts 
of a married woman just in the same way as it would apply 
to the contracts of a feme sole or any other person not 
incapacitated from entering into a contract. The analogy of 
the Statute of Limitations, therefore, was applicable to the 
debts and obligations of a married woman. Then it was said 
that the Statute ought not to run in this case because the debt 
was contracted by the married woman with her husband, who 
could not bring an action against his own wife. It was no 
doubt true that there could be no judgment in an ordinary 
way against a married woman, and that the Court would 
require the trustees to be before the Court. The fact that in 
this case the husband was himself the trustee would not have 
prevented his obtaining payment of the debt, as he had the 
legal ownership of the fund which was liable to satisfy the debt. 
His Lordship, after referring to and explaining the cases which 
had been cited in argument, said, in reference to the Irish 
case of Vaughan v. Walker (8 Ir. Ch. Rep., 458), on which 
reliance had been placed on behalf of the appellant, that it 
was to be observed that Lord Justice Blackburn had differed 
from the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, who had (in his 
Lordship's opinion), come to a wrong conclusion in thinking 
that the Statute of Limitations did not affect a simple contract 
claim against the separate estate of a married woman. The 
decision of Mr. Justice Kay was correct, and the appeal must 
be dismissed.5' 
The M. W. P., 1882, has emphasized this doctrine. 
On January ist, 1883, every married woman became 
discovert within the meaning of sec. 7 of the Statute 
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of Limitations. (21 Jac. 1, c, 16; Lowe v. Fox, 1885, 
15 Q. B. D., 667.) 
Before January ist, 1883, a married woman could 
make a valid contract to sell or charge her lands, 
provided that her husband concurred, and the contract 
were made by deed acknowledged in accordance with 
the Fines and Recoveries Act (3 and 4 Will, iv., c. 74), 
as amended by sec. 7 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882. 
The husband's concurrence might be dispensed with 
by leave of the Court in certain cases (sec. 91). These 
relations of husband and wife are, however, now 
rendered of comparatively little importance by the 
operation of the M. W. P., 1882, about to be considered, 
although it must always be remembered that none of 
these M. W. P. Acts are retrospective, except in details 
not affecting the argument. 
As in this Thesis chronological order is being 
generally observed, the effect of sec. 39 of the 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (44 
and 45 Vict., c. 41), will here be noted. The section 
is as follows :— 
(1.) "Notwithstanding that a married woman is restrained'from 
anticipation, the Court may, if it thinks fit, where it appears 
to the Court to be for her benefit, by judgment or order, with 
her consent, bind her interest in any property." 
(2.) "This section applies only to judgments or orders made after 
the commencement of this Act." 
The parties themselves could not and still are not 
able by consent to get rid of a restraint against anticipa-
tion. Previous to the powers conferred by the Act the 
Court had no authority to release a married woman 
from the restraint, even when it was plainly for her 
c 
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interest to do so. (Lush, p. 264.) But it has been 
laid down that under the Statute, a very strong ground 
must be shown for such an application to be granted. 
It was held in, in re Wood-Wood v. Kimber, 1884 
(1 T. L. R., 192), that the Court would not exercise 
the power conferred by the section in question and 
remove the restraint on anticipation imposed upon a 
married woman interested in settled property, unless it 
would be manifestly for her benefit to do so, or for the 
benefit of her husband and family. 
"This is a discretionary power, which, in my opinion, ought to he 
exercised with extreme caution, and only where a very strong 
case for its exercise is made out. If we acceded to the 
present application, I think we should be holding out 
encouragement to tenants for life with powers of appointment 
to form schemes of this kind for getting the benefit of the 
reversionary interests of their children. (Per. Lopes, L . J . , 
in re Little, Harrison v. Harrison, 1889, 40 Ch., D. 424 ) 
From these and other cases we may gather that 
the Court will not allow the restraint to be removed in 
order to benefit the creditors, but where the petitioner 
is harassed and annoyed by their pressing claims, it 
will grant her application. 
Some changes in procedure by which the rights 
and liabilities of married women are enforced have 
already been noted. I t will, however, be more 
convenient in view of the alterations brought about 
by the M. W. P., 1882, to postpone any detailed notice 
of changes in the ''adjective law" relating to the 
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subject to a separate section. Consequently in the 
following pages there will be a curtailment of treat-
ment of this branch of the Thesis until the section in 
question is reached. 
When the M. W. P., 1882, became law, the 
contractual status of a married woman underwent 
alteration. After enacting (sec. 1, sub-sec. 1), that :— 
" A married woman shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act, be capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing by will 
or otherwise, of any real or personal property as her separate 
property, in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, 
without the intervention of any trustee." 
Sub-sec. 2, 3, and 4 of sec. 1 proceed :— 
(2.) " A married woman shall be capable of entering into and 
rendering herself liable in respect of and to the extent of her 
separate property on any contract, and of suing and being 
sued, either in contract or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects 
as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined 
with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any 
action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against 
her; and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such 
action or proceeding shall be her separate property; and any 
damages or costs recovered against her in any such action or 
proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property, and 
not otherwise." 
{3.) " Every contract entered into by a married woman shall be 
deemed to be a contract entered into by her with respect to 
and to bind her separate property, unless the contrary be 
shown." 
{4.) " Every contract entered into by a married woman with respect 
to and to bind her separate property shall bind not only the 
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separate property which she is possessed of or entitled to at 
the date of the contract, but also all separate property which 
she may thereafter acquire." 
The first question which arose on this Act was as 
to what sort of liability the Legislature intended to 
impose upon a married woman. Was it a personal 
liability, or, as formerly, a proprietary liability attach-
ing only to the separate estate ? Would the remedy of 
the person who sued her be by personal action against 
herself or by action in rem to establish a charge against 
the separate estate? Sub-sec. 2 reads "a married 
woman shall be capable of rendering herself liable, 
although the subsequent wording may be taken as a 
qualifying clause in respect of and to the extent of her 
separate property." The same sub-sec. declares that 
a married woman may be sued in all respects as if she 
were a feme sole, which prima facie would seem to 
imply that she might be sued to judgment as a feme 
sole, and that therefore a personal judgment might be 
obtained against her. And yet on the other hand, as 
we have seen, the Act certainly seems to contemplate 
a distinction between a proprietary liability and a 
personal liability of the normal kind. It says in the 
15th sec, that a joint judgment against husband and 
wife in respect of a debt contracted by the wife before 
marriage shall be "a joint judgment against the husband 
personally, and against the wife as to her separate 
property only." 
There is certainly a dificulty arising from the 
phraseology of the enactment as to whether a married 
woman was intended by the Act to contract a personal 
liability or not. The first case where the question 
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actually came up for decision was Draycott v. Harrison, 
1886 (-17 Q. B. D., 150). In that case the plaintiff 
endeavoured to establish that since the Act of 1882, a 
married woman whose only property was subject to a 
restraint on anticipation could render herself personally 
liable, and could be imprisoned under the Debtor's Act. 
Judgment had been actually signed against her by 
default, execution being limited to the separate property 
not subject to any restraint on anticipation, unless by 
reason of sec. 19 of the M. W. P., 1882, the property 
be liable to execution notwithstanding such restriction. 
The only evidence of her ability to pay was, that since 
the date of the judgment she had received sufficient 
income of separate property subject to a restraint on 
anticipation. The Court held that to attach dividends 
accrued due after the judgment would indirectly do 
away with the restriction, and that sec. 5 of the 
Debtor's Act only applied to personal judgments, and 
that the judgment in this case was not a personal, but 
a proprietary judgment only. 
In Pal User v. Gurney, 1887 (19 Q. B. D., 517), 
this confinement to proprietary liability was again laid 
down, and the decisions at last came to a head in 
Scott v. M or ley, 1887 (20 Q. B. D., 120), when it was 
decided that the Statute had not altered the nature of 
a married woman's liability. This decision still 
embodies the law on the subject. A judgment may 
be against a married woman, but execution is confined 
to her separate property. 
Lord Esher, M. R., in the course of his judgment 
in this case said :— 
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" What were the liabilities imposed upon a married woman by the 
Married Women's Property Act, 1882 ? Sec. 1, sub-sec. 2, 
imposed a new liability upon her in respect of her contracts 
made after marriage, and gave a new remedy at law, and so 
the ordinary rule applied that where a Statute imposed a new 
liability and provided a new remedy, the remedy so provided 
was the only remedy. The sub-sec. said that any damages 
should be payable out of her separate property. It did not 
say that the damages should be payable by her. The judg-
ment under that sub-sec. ought to follow the words of the 
Act. The judgment imposed a new liability at law which 
produced the same result as that previously given in equity— 
namely, a charge only upon her separate estate. The last 
question was whether the Debtor's Act, 1869, was applicable 
to such a judgment. Sec. 5, in speaking of "the debt due 
from him," meant the debt which he was personally liable to 
pay. I f the Debtor's Act was treated as conferring a power 
to commit, it was a penal Statute, and must be construed 
strictly as involving the liberty of the subject. I f the Act 
was treated as a remedial Act, it was not wanted, as there was 
nothing to modify. Therefore, the Courts had no power to 
apply the Debtor's Act, 1869, to judgments under the Married 
Women's Property Act, 1882." 
The form of the judgment which the M. W. P., 
1882, enables a plaintiff to recover against a married 
woman was settled by the Court of Appeal in connexion 
with the same case. It is as follows :— 
" It is adjudged that the plaintiff do recover £ and costs, to 
be taxed against the defendant (the married woman), such 
sum and costs to be payable out of her separate property, as 
hereinafter mentioned, and not otherwise. And it is ordered 
that execution hereon be limited to the separate property of 
the defendant (the married woman) not subject to any 
restriction against anticipation, unless by reason of sec. 19 of 
the M. W. P., 1882, the property shall be liable notwithstanding 
such restriction." 
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A bankruptcy notice cannot be issued against a 
married woman for :— 
" Sec. 4, sub-sec. i ( £ ) , of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, was the 
sub-sec. under which it was to be served, and by that sub-sec, 
if a creditor obtained a final judgment against a person, the 
notice was to require that person to pay the judgment debt in 
accordance with the terms of the judgment. The bankruptcy 
notice to be served must require the person to pay the judg-
ment debt in accordance with the terms of the judgment, and 
must be in the prescribed form. Form No. 6 did not follow 
the form of judgment against a married woman. There was 
no form given which followed the form of judgment against a 
married woman. The judgment against a married woman 
required her to pay the debt out of her separate estate. This 
bankruptcy notice required her to pay the debt personally. 
That was not in accordance with the terms of the judgment. 
The consequence was that as against a married woman a 
bankruptcy notice could not be issued. (Per Lord Esher, 
M. R. , in re Lynes, 1893, 2 Q. B., 113 ) " 
Even if the husband dies after the judgment and 
before the notice served, there is the same failure of 
application so far as a bankruptcy notice is concerned. 
Proceedings under the Debtor's Act, as we have seen, 
cannot be taken to enforce the married woman's 
liability (Scott v. M or ley), though garnishee proceed-
ings may be taken against her. (Holtby v. Hodgson, 
1889, 24 Q. B. D., 103.) In this case Lord Esher 
defined "proprietary liability" a term we have used 
freely in this Thesis. 
" Proprietary liability is a short and compendious way of stating 
the proposition that a judgment obtained against a married 
woman must be executed against her property, and not 
against her person." 
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If then (subsequent to the M. W. P., 1882, 
becoming operative), under a contract, the liability of a 
married woman is only a charge on her separate estate 
not restrained from anticipation, the questions arise, 
what is the separate estate that can be charged, and in 
what particulars (if any), has the law on the subject 
previous to 1882, been changed. We will take the 
second question first. Under the old law, as con-
summated in Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 1881, in order to 
make a judgment available against the separate estate 
of a married woman it was necessary to prove (as 
before stated), that (a) at the date of the contract 
she was possessed of or entitled to property for her 
own separate use; (bj it was not fettered by any 
restriction against anticipation ; (c) some of that 
property still remained at the date of the judgment. 
Sec. 1 (sub-sec. 4) of the Act enacted that whenever 
the conditions of (sub-sec. 3), have been fulfilled—i.e., 
when a contract has been entered into by a feme covert 
which presumably binds her separate property—then 
execution may issue not only against the separate 
property she originally possessed when contracting (if 
any still remain), but also against any that she has 
subsequently acquired. The words in italics indicate 
the change that has been wrought. Creditors, however, 
were still at a disadvantage, on account of the 
interpretation of sub-sec. 3 by the Courts, which 
amounted to leaving the old law as it was in one 
important respect. It was decided in a series of cases 
that a corollary of the married woman's liability being 
only proprietary was this :—that the plaintiff had to 
prove the possession of separate property at the time 
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of making the contract. (In re Shakespear, 1885, 30 
Ch., D. 169; Palliser v. Gurney, 1887, 19 Q. B. D., 
519; Stogdon v. Lee, 1891, 1 Q. B., 661.) 
"The plain object of the Act was to confer on married women 
having separate estate a capacity to contract and to extend 
the capacity which they had already in Courts of Equity. The 
enabling clause was sub-sec. 2, and if any one sued a married 
woman under that clause it was clear that he could not 
succeed unless he showed that she had separate estate. (Per 
Lindley, L . J . , in Palliser v. Gurney.) " 
Under the 1882 Act the separate property must 
have been such that the married woman could 
reasonably be supposed to contract with reference to 
it. (Harrison v. Harrison, 1888, 13 P. D., 180; 
•Beckett v. Tasker, 1887, 19 Q. B. D., 7; Leake v. 
Driffield, 1889, 24 Q. B. D., 98 ; Braunstein v. Lewis, 
1891, 65 L. T., 449.) In the last named case, Kay, 
L. J., said :— 
" By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, a married woman 
can contract with respect to her separate property. It was 
argued that the law would presume the contract to be made 
with respect to her separate property, if she had any, however 
small, at the time of the contract. That, however, would 
involve an absurdity. It would be absurd to presume that a 
married woman with £2 10s. in her pocket as her separate 
property had contracted a debt of ^1,000 with respect to 
that separate property." 
In Leake v. Driffield, the separate estate consisted 
merely of the clothing of the married woman and her 
children. 
It was also decided that under sec. 1 (sub-sec. 4) 
of the Act, property which a married woman acquired 
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after the death of her husband could not be reached 
by a creditor who had recovered a judgment on a 
contract made by her during the coverture. (Beckett 
v. Tasker, 1887 ; Pelton v. Harrison, 1891, 7 T. L. R., 
686.) In reading the judgment of the Court in the 
last named case, Kay, L. J., said with reference to 
sec. 1 (sub-sec. 4) of the 1882 Act :— 
" In my opinion, the mischief which this section of the Act was 
intended to remedy was that pointed out by the decision in 
Pike v. Fitzgibbon, where it was held that separate property 
acquired during coverture after the date of the engagement 
sued on could not be reached under a judgment against the 
married woman. It was intended to make such after-acquired 
separate property liable to execution, but not any property 
acquired by her when not under coverture, nor any property, 
though separate property, as to which during coverture she 
was restrained from anticipation. It does not enable a married 
woman who has no separate property at the time to bind her-
self by a contract or engagement. (Palliser v. Gurney, 19 
Q. H. P., 519; Stogdon v. Lee, 1891, I Q. B., 661.) Nor 
does it enable her, if she has separate property, to bind herself 
except in respect of that separate property and any other 
which she may thereafter acquire. The point was decided in 
the same way in Beckett v. Tusker, 19 Q. B. D., 7." 
With regard to this binding of the separate 
property, the Act is not retrospective. In Turnbull 
v. Forman, 1884, 1 T. L. R., p. 557, this doctrine was 
laid down with regard to sec. 1 (sub-sec. 4). Where 
judgment had been obtained against a married woman 
on a promissory note made before the passing of the 
Act, judgment could only operate on such property as 
the defendant had at the time when the note was made, 
and was then freed from any restraint on anticipation, 
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thus following the lines of the decision in Pike v. 
Fitzoibbon. 
By sec. 19 of the Act (subject to the proviso at 
the end of the section already quoted) property subject 
to a restraint on anticipation is unaffected by the 
Statute. In Draycott v. Harrison, 1886 (17 Q. B. D., 
150), it was held that a married woman is no more 
capable of contracting and rendering herself liable upon 
contract in respect of her separate property, which is 
subject to a restraint upon anticipation, than she was 
before the Act of 1882 was passed. 
The question arises, does a restraint on anticipa-
tion apply to arrears of income become due and payable 
at or before the date of the judgment ? 
In 1891, an action by a married woman was 
dismissed with costs, execution being limited to her 
separate estate without restraint on anticipation. The 
Court of Appeal upheld an order giving her trustees 
liberty to retain the costs out of income, to which she 
was entitled for her separate use, without power of 
anticipation, which had accrued since the commence-
ment of the action. (Cox v. Bennett, 1891, T. L. R. 
vii., 317.) This decision has been in principle confirmed 
in the important case of Hood Barrs v. Heriot, 1896, 
A. C, 174, after the law had passed through an 
intermediate stage of uncertainty as expressed in 
Pillars v. Edwards, 1894 (71 L. T., 788), and Hood 
Barrs v. Cat hear I} 1894, 2 Q. B., 559. In the case of 
Hood Barrs v. Heriot, the circumstances, as has been 
intimated, were similar to those in Cox v. Bennett. 
Had the appellant the right to enforce payment of a 
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judgment which he had obtained against the respondent, 
a married woman having property, the income of which 
she was restrained from anticipating, out of the arrears 
of income which were due to the respondent at the 
date of the judgment, and which had not then reached 
her hands. In his judgment Lord Macnaughten 
said :— 
" The order under appeal depends upon the proposition that it is 
not competent for a married woman, entitled for her separate 
use without power of anticipation, to dispose of income 
accrued due unless and until it reaches her own hands or the 
hands of her agent. This proposition was laid down for the 
first time in 1894 by the Court of Appeal. There is nothing 
to suggest it in the circumstances which originally gave rise to 
the restraint on anticipation. Nor can it, I think, be supported 
on principle, or on any grounds of convenience, or on authority. 
Everybody, I suppose, would concede that in limiting income 
to the separate use of a married woman, without power of 
anticipation, the primary intention is that if things go wrong 
she may have a sure and certain provision for her maintenance. 
But what is to happen if things do go wrong and her income 
is in arrear ? Tenants are sometimes behindhand; mortgagors 
are not always prompt. If the Court of Appeal is right, it 
might well happen that a married woman with an ample pro-
vision, and striving honestly to live within her income, would 
be brought into great straits. I f her income fell into arrear 
she would be unable to procure an advance ; she could make 
no contract even for the necessaries of life. It is all very well 
to prevent a married woman from gathering the fruit, which 
will be hers in time, before it becomes ripe. When it is ripe, 
why should she be forbidden to touch it ? Why should she 
have to wait until it falls into her lap ? Why should the 
Court, in its zeal for the security of her property, place it out 
of her reach when it ought to be in her pocket, and when, 
perhaps, she wants it most, and all for fear it should come into 
her husband's hands ? So long as things go well there is no 
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reason why a married woman should not let her husband have 
her income, if she knows what she is about. If things go 
amiss there is the restraint on anticipation, ready for use, and 
as useful for all practical purposes as if it had the effect 
attributed to it by the Court of Appeal, and without the 
disadvantage of bringing with it liability to a most inconvenient 
embargo." 
The law therefore is, that a judgment against a 
married woman may be enforced against arrears of 
income, subject to restraint upon anticipation, accrued 
due at or before the date of the judgment. 
With regard to this important judgment it has 
been written u sed queere, at any rate since the Act of 
1893, sec. 1." For similar questions arising with regard 
to orders to pay costs see post (p. ). 
I t is clear that income coming to hand after the 
judgment, cannot be reached to satisfy the judgment. 
Wkiteley v. Edwards, 1896 (2 Q. B., 48.) 
The main object of the M. W. P., 1893 (56 and 
57 Vict., c. 63), appears to be the alteration of the rule 
established by such cases as in re Skakespear, 1885 (30 
Ch., D. 169); Palliser v. Gurney, 1887 (19 Q. B. D., 
519); Braunstein v. Lewis, 1891 (65 L. T., 449); and 
Stogdon v. Lee, 1891, 1 Q. B., 661), all before quoted. 
We have already seen the effect of the cases which 
declared that a contract of a married woman, not made 
by her as the agent of her husband, is void unless at 
the time of contract she possesses separate estate free 
from restraint on anticipation, and of such a character 
that the Court will presume she intended to charge it 
with the fulfilment of the contract. The object of this 
amending Statute is to enable a creditor of a married 
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woman to obtain payment out of any property free of 
restraint she may have at the date of his obtaining 
judgment (and after), without requiring him to prove 
that the woman was possessed of separate estate at 
the time she entered into the contract. 
The first section provides that every contract 
hereafter entered into by a married woman, otherwise 
than as agent, 
(a) Shall be deemed to be a contract entered into 
by her with respect to and to bind her separate property, 
whether she is or is not in fact possessed of or entitled 
to any separate property at the time when she enters 
into such contract ; 
(b) Shall bind all separate property which she may 
at that time or thereafter be possessed of or entitled to; 
and 
(c) Shall also be enforceable by process of law 
against all property which she may thereafter while 
discovert be possessed of or entitled to; 
Provided that nothing* in this section contained 
shall render available to satisfy any liability or obliga-
tion arising out of such contract any separate property 
which at the time or thereafter she is restrained from 
anticipating. 
The fourth section repeals sub-sees. 3 and 4 of 
sec. 1 of the M . W. P., 1882, the provisions of which 
are more widely enacted by sec. 1 of the later Statute. 
Sub-sec (c) reverses the law as laid down in 
Beckett v. Tasker, 1887 (19 Q. B. D., 7), and Pelton v. 
Harrison, 1891 (T. L. R. vii., 686). 
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Sec. 2 is considered in the division of the Thesis 
which treats particularly of Procedure. 
The concluding portion of sec. i re-enacts the 
similar provision in sec. 19 of the M. W. P., 1882, and 
leaves unaffected sec. 39 of the Conveyancing and 
Law of Property Act, 1881. 
I t has been mentioned (p. 29), that in equity, a 
married woman incurred no liability in the absence of 
separate estate at the date of the trial. Since the 
M. W. P. Acts, 1882 and 1893, it is perhaps unnecessary 
to prove such existence, although the legal position is 
not altogether clear. (See Lush, pp. 308-310.) 
POST-NUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS.—Where the settle-
ment is post-nuptial, all those weighty and important 
considerations which spring from the independent 
position of the parties before matrimony, and from 
their altered state after it, are wanting. The husband 
and wife were formerly incapable of contracting with 
each other because the wife was under the disability of 
coverture. 
" What I go upon is this, that here was no contract on the part of 
the wife. She was incapable of contracting, being under 
coverture." (Per Lord Hardwicke in Lanoy v. Duchess of 
Athol, 2 Atk. 444, 448.) 
< 
In equity, however, a wife might have validly 
contracted with her husband as to her separate property 
Now by the M.W. P., 1882, the doctrine of equity 
has received Statutory recognition. (Macqueen, pp. 
264-5.) 
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Post-nuptial settlements in general will be deemed 
voluntary for want of consideration, but if a settlement 
is executed after marriage in pursuance of a valid ante-
nuptial agreement it of course acquires the validity of 
an ante-nuptial settlement. Under certain circum-
stances, such as where valuable consideration moves 
from third parties, a post-nuptial settlement may be 
rendered unimpeachable (Macqtieen, p. 266, and cases 
there cited). The discussion of these conditions is not, 
however, within our province. 
We have already commented on sec. 19 of the 
1882 Act (pages 19 and 21). Under it the validity of 
settlements is not disturbed, subject to a proviso against 
fraud. A voluntary post-nuptial settlement made by 
wife or husband, of course will be void against creditors 
under this proviso, and 13 Eliz., c. 5, though binding 
as between the parties themselves, and subsisting for 
all other purposes (Lush, pp. 228-9). Voluntary post-
nuptial settlements made by a wife would probably 
come under sec. 47 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 
the result of which briefly speaking, is that if a person 
makes a voluntary post-nuptial settlement of his property 
and becomes bankrupt within two years of doing so, the 
settlement is void against his creditors ; and if the 
settlor becomes bankrupt within even ten years of the 
settlement, he must be prepared to show that he was 
solvent when he made it, without the aid of the property 
comprised in the settlement. This section refers only 
specifically to settlements made by a man on his wife 
and children. We need not limit the application. A 
feme covert carrying on a separate trade can now be 
made bankrupt ; and under such circumstances her 
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voluntary settlements would come under the section ; 
for the proviso in sec. 19 of the M. W. P., 1882, places 
her in the same position as a man so far as that enact-
ment is concerned ; also by sec. 152 of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 1883, 4 4 nothing in this Act shall affect the pro-
visions of the M. W. P., 1882." 
Mention has been made (p. 25) of settlement 
policies which received Statutory recognition by the 
M. W. P., 1870. Sec. 11 of the 1882 Act re-enacts 
the earlier clause with variations, but there is a proviso 
to protect creditors against fraud. 
With regard to the possessions of a wife married 
after January ist, 1883, and to property acquired by a 
wife subsequent to that date, the M.W. P., 1882, would 
bar any binding of such separate property by a covenant 
in a post-nuptial settlement, unless the wife joined in 
the covenant, or made a separate covenant. (See 
cases quoted in Lush, p. 515, note k.) 
SEPARATE TRADING BY A MARRIED WOMAN.— 
I t has been stated already, that judgment may be 
obtained against a married woman, but only her 
separate " free" property can be taken in execution 
That therefore she cannot be imprisoned on a debtor's 
summons, and that a bankruptcy notice of an ad 
personam character cannot issue against her. Never-
theless she can be made bankrupt, for by sec. 1 
(sub-sec 5) of the M. W. P. 1882, "every married 
woman carrying on a trade separately from her husband 
shall, in respect of her separate property, be subject to 
the bankruptcy laws in the same way as if she were a 
feme sole." I t would seem that if there had been no 
special provision on the subject in this Statute a 
D 
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married woman would in every case have been capable 
of being made a bankrupt. But the law has in this 
respect placed her in an exceptional position. Only 
while carrying on the separate trade is she subject to 
bankruptcy law in respect of her trading contracts and 
liabilities. Otherwise she is under a personal incapacity 
to be made bankrupt. (Seepost, page .) 
Under the old law, a feme covert, whether she had 
separate estate or not, was not under any circumstances 
liable to bankruptcy law, unless she were a trader 
within the customs of London, or her husband was 
civiliter mortuus. (See pages 2-4.) In exp. Jones, 12 
Ch., D. 484, the question was raised whether a married 
woman possessed of separate property was capable of 
being made a bankrupt. James, L. J., in his judgment 
remarked as follows :— 
"The married woman who contracts in that way is not a debtor in 
any sense of the word, and she, not being a debtor, the whole 
foundation of the appellant's case fails. A debtor's summons 
is a summons against the debtor. The respondent is not a 
debtor, and therefore there was no legal authority to issue a 
debtor's summons against her, and no proceedings in 
bankruptcy founded upon it could be effectually taken." 
If a married woman is made bankrupt only her 
separate property is affected (sec. 5 of the M. W. P., 
1882). In the case, therefore, of a woman married before 
the operation of this Act, her interest in real estate not 
settled to her separate use, of which she and her 
husband are seised in her right, as also any choses in 
action her title to which accrued before January ist, 
1883, and which have not been reduced into possession 
by her husband, would not be included. 
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Previous to recent Statutory provision the feme 
covert who traded on her own account was not indeed 
liable to bankruptcy law, for she could not in reality 
trade " separately " at all. With the slight exceptions 
already alluded to (pages 2-4), she could only trade as 
her husband's agent, and the wages and earnings s\^e 
might acquire by her own independent labour and skill, 
belonged in common with her own personal property 
to her husband. The M. W. P., 1870 (sec. 1), 
interfered to a certain extent with this doctrine. 
This section applied to all married women whether 
married before or after the commencement of the Act. 
Under its operation it was decided in re Dearmer fames 
v. Dearmer (53 L. T., 905) that if a woman married 
before the passing of the M. W. P., 1870, carried on a 
separate business as a schoolmistress with the permis-
sion of her husband, who lived in the same house, but 
for her own benefit, the goodwill of the business be-
longed to the wife, and not to the husband's executors. 
The marriage took place in 1862, and the husband died 
in 1877. 
This provision in the earlier Act has, however, 
been superseded by the 1882 Statute, the 2nd sec. of 
which enacts, that :— 
" Every woman who marries after the commencement of this 
Act shall be entitled to have and to hold as her separate 
property, and to dispose of in manner aforesaid, all real and 
personal property which shall belong to her at the time of 
marriage, or shall be acquired by or devolve upon her after 
• marriage, including any wages, earnings, money, and property 
gained or acquired by her in any employment, trade, or 
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occupation, in which she is engaged, or which she carries on 
separately from her husband, or by the exercise of any literary, 
artistic, or scientific skill." 
The 5th sec. makes the same provision with 
respect to women married before the commencement 
of the Act. 
In Smith v. Hancock (1894, T. L. R. x., 433), it 
was held that if a vendor of a business covenants " not 
to carry on or be in anywise interested in " a business 
similar to that sold, there is no breach of such covenant 
where the vendor's wife carries on such business 
trading separately from him with her separate estate. 
Lindley, L. J., observed in reference to the case :— 
" An agreement by a husband not to do a thing does not oblige 
him to prevent his wife from doing that same thing if she has 
a right to do it independently of him." 
And Smith, L. J., in his judgment said :— 
" Before the passing of the Married Women's Property Acts of 
1870 and 1882 I do not doubt that a wife, setting up business 
in the way Mrs. Hancock has, would have done so as agent 
for her husband, for as long as coverture existed she could do 
so in no other capacity, and her acts would then constitute a 
breach of covenant by the husband, on the principle quifacit 
per alhim facit per se. But this is not so now. The wife, 
although coverture exists, can nevertheless trade with her 
own separate property, apart from her husband and free 
from his control, as if she were a feme sole, as and when she 
pleases, and, if she does so, she is no more the agent for her 
husband than his father, uncle, or brother would be under like 
circumstances, nor can the husband restrain his wife from so 
acting." 
We need not enlarge on "wages" or earnings 
acquired by literary, &c, skill. The chief legal questions 
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arise under a married woman's separate trading. So 
far as relations between the wife and husband are 
concerned, it is clear that under the later Act all that 
the wife earns and acquires by her separate trade is her 
own, provided there is no contract between husband 
and wife to the contrary. 
What constitutes carrying on a trade separately 
from the husband ? I t is clear from the Dearmer case 
already referred to, that there need be no " visible " 
separation between husband and wife. They may live 
in the same house. 
The husband may render " reasonable assistance " 
and the wife will still be separate trader. Ashworth v. 
Outram (5 Ch., D. 923). I f he actually interferes, he 
takes the case out of the Statute. If he assumes the 
proprietorship, and acts in such a way as to make 
himself the real master, and liable as principle to third 
parties, if he " makes the business his own," the trade 
is not such a "separate trading" by the wife as to 
entitle her (in the absence of contract), to the profits 
and trade property as her separate property, by virtue 
of sees. 2 and 5 of the 1882 Act. (Lush, p. 165 and 
cases cited ; ibid for details of evidence required as to 
what the trading relations really are.) 
" What does * trading separately from the husband' in the 
Married Women's Property Act of 1882 mean? It must 
mean, as it seems to me, without attempting any precise 
definition or description of " separately trading," a trading in 
such a way that in fact, as between herself and her husband, 
the husband could make out no claim to the property and 
benefits of the trading; in such a way that the profits of the 
business and the assets of the business, as between husband 
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and wife, belong solely to her." (Per Kennedy, J . , in re 
Helsby, 1893, L . J . Q. B., 261.) 
From what has just been said it is a fortiori 
probable that a trade is not a married woman's separate 
trade if carried on in partnership with her husband. 
And this is the law. f i n re Helsby.) 
A wife may, however, be a partner in a trading 
partnership, to the extent of the contractual power 
given her by the M. W. P. Acts, 1882, and 1893. She 
may be a partner with her husband. (Butler v. Butler, 
1885, 16 Q. B. D., 374.) She may have her stipulated 
right to share in the profits of the concern ; she will 
incur the liabilities of the firm ; and the fact that she is 
carrying on business as a partner has been held to be 
sufficient evidence that she was possessed of separate 
estate at the time when it was necessary to prove the 
existence of separate estate to make her liable on a 
contract made under the Act of 1882. (Eddowes v. 
Argentine Co., 62 L. T., 602 ; See also in re Helsby 
and Lush, p. 170.) 
A feme covert can now enter into a contract with 
her husband as if she were a feme sole, and thus by 
contract regulate her trading status so far as relates to 
him, independently of Statutory protection. 
We have seen that in re Dearmer the goodwill of 
the business is reckoned an asset equally with the 
earnings, so in the 1882 Act property gained or 
acquired in the separate trade is specifically mentioned. 
As long as the trade debts remain unpaid the 
the married woman is carrying on the trade. (In re 
Dagnail, 1896, 2 Q. B., 407.) 
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Contracts as Agent. 
I . — A G E N T FOR HUSBAND. 
This is a most important branch of law. " I n no 
case pleaded before in this Court were a larger portion 
of mankind concerned ; for the judgment delivered in 
it concerned the two sexes— that is, so many of each as 
are married or will be married. Nor could such interest 
be nearer or more direct, since it related to the acts of 
wives, who are by the law of this Country and the law 
of God, accounted identical with their husbands." 
(Manby v. Scott, 1661, quoted in Smith's Leading 
Cases, ioth edit., vol. I I . , 437-8.) I t can no longer be 
said that by "the law of this Country" wives are 
" accounted identical with their husbands." Neverthe-
less " Manby v. Scott" is the leading case on the subject. 
Followed up by Montague v. Benedict, 1825 (3 Barn and 
Cress, 631), Seat on v. Benedict, 1828 (5 Bing., 28), 
Jolly v. Bees, 1864 (15 C. B., N. S., 628), Debenhamv. 
Mellon, 1880 (6 App., Cas. 24), and illustrated on 
different sides by other cases a body of lex non script a 
has been developed, on which modern legislation has 
had but little direct effect. It is therefore not within 
the scope of this Thesis to treat this branch of a married 
woman's contracts at any length. Notwithstanding the 
quoted observations of some of the Judges in Manby v. 
Scott as to the legal identity of husband and wife, for 
a very long time the authority of a wife to bind her 
husband by her contracts has been considered to be a 
branch of the law of principal and agent. " A man 
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shall be charged in debt for the contract of his bailiff 
or servant, where he giveth authority to his bailiff or 
servant to buy or sell for him ; and so for the contract 
of his wife, if he giveth authority to his wife, otherwise 
not" (Fitzy. Nat. Brev. 120 G.). The wife was con-
sidered as an agent who stipulated for no personal 
liability (Smout v. Ilbery, 1842, 10 Mee. & W. I.), so 
that she could not be sued, either on an implied 
warranty of authority, or on the contract, when her 
husband was in fact dead at the time when the goods 
were supplied (ibid). 
The mere fact of marriage does not imply that 
authority is given by the husband to the wife to act as 
his agent. (Debenham v. Mellon, 1880.) In this case 
the Court said :— 
" I f there is an establishment of which there is a domestic manager, 
although the wife may be the most natural domestic manager, 
and though the presumption may be strongest when she is so, 
yet the same presumption may and often does arise from 
similar facts, when the actual manager is not a wife, but merely 
a woman living with a man and passing as his companion, 
with or without the assumption of the name of wife. It is 
also the same where the person, to whom the domestic 
arrangement is delegated, is a housekeeper or a steward, or 
any other kind of superior servant." 
The authority given by the husband may be either 
(1) express, (2) implied, or (3) ostensible, i.e., the 
husband may have so conducted himself as to preclude 
himself from denying the authority. The general legal 
treatment and differentiations of these various kinds of 
agency contracts have been elaborately dealt with in 
various treatises, and are without our sphere, as 
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indicated by the title of the Thesis. Cases 1 and 3 
are independent of recent legislation. With regard to 
2, it is submitted that although recent legislation has 
not formally altered the liability of the husband for 
contracts made by his wife, as his agent (Wilson v. 
Glossop, 1888, 2 Q. B. D., 354), yet, as by sec. 1 (sub-
sec. 3) of the 1882 Act, every contract entered into by 
her shall be deemed to be entered into with respect to and 
to bind her separate property, mil ess the contrary be 
shown, the onus was placed on the married woman to 
remove the presumption that she intended in entering 
into a contract to bind her separate property. Formerly 
the burden of proof lay on the other party; who had to 
make it clear, ordering "necessaries" that she intended 
to make her separate property liable. It appeared, 
however, to be forgotten that most women contract 
as agents, so 11 years later we find that agency is 
distinctly recognized in the latest of the M. W. P. Acts. 
Sec. 1 of the 1893 Act enacts, " Every contract here-
after entered into by a married woman, otherwise than 
as agent, <2fc." 
Although in the later Act agency is specifically 
referred to, the proviso in the earlier Statute " unless 
the contrary be shown," is omitted. Therefore if 
agency be not established, separate property, present 
or future* would seem to be irresistibly bound. The 
establishment of implied authority is a question of fact; 
different considerations apply, according as husband 
and wife are living together, or apart. 
Where the parties were living apart by mutual 
consent, and the husband had agreed to pay the wife 
an allowance and neglected to do so, the wife, if she 
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had not sufficient means of her own, had an absolute 
right by law to pledge the husband's credit for suitable 
necessaries. 
" The wife's necessaries are such articles as the law deems essential 
to her health and comfort; chiefly food, drink, lodging, fuel, 
washing, clothing, and medical attendance. They are to be 
determined, both in kind and amount, by the means and social 
position of the married pair, and must therefore vary greatly 
among different grades and at different stages of society. 
Thus a large milliner's bill might not be deemed necessaries 
for the wife of a labourer, while a wealthy merchant would be 
bound to pay it. So too, necessaries to-day are not what they 
were fifty years ago. Nor is the ordinary test to be found in 
the real situation and means of the married parties (for this a 
tradesman cannot be expected to investigate), but in their 
apparent situation, the style they assume, and the establish-
ment they maintain before the world; which every husband is 
supposed to regulate with sufficient prudence. Articles too, 
may be of a kind which the law pronounces necessaries, and 
yet a wife may be so well supplied as not to need the 
particular articles in question,—a distinction of some con-
sequence. The decisions in the books, relating to necessaries, 
are therefore somewhat confusing, as might be expected; the 
more so since the dividing line between law and fact in such 
cases is not marked with distinctness. Sometimes the Court 
decides whether articles are necessary, sometimes a jury. The 
ordinary rule is that the Court shall decide whether certain 
articles are to be classed as necessaries; while the jury may 
determine the question of amount and apply the classification 
to the facts." (Schouler, Law of Domestic Relations, $tk 
edit., p. 99. J 
Norton, all quoted in Smith's L. C. (10th edit., vol. 2, 
pp. 475 and 487.) 
These statements are, we submit, supported by 
the English decisions, e. Phillipson v. . Hayter 
Jolly v. Rees; Hunt v. De Blaquiere; Emmett v. 
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When the husband and wife cohabit, it was laid 
down in the first named case that "necessaries" should 
"fall fairly within the domestic department which is 
ordinarily confined to the management of the wife." 
The word in fact has a different connotation 
according as the parties are living together in the usual 
way; or living together while the wife is deprived of 
the bare means of subsistence; or living apart. 
The wife, however, can now by virtue of power 
conferred bv legislation, sue her husband on the 
contract to pay alimony. Notwithstanding this newly 
given contractual status, it seems that the common law 
authority of the wife still exists as a concurrent remedy. 
The husband used to be liable, whether he made 
his wife an allowance, or not, for the cost of legal 
proceedings rendered necessary through his misconduct; 
and her solicitor could recover from him, whatever the 
event of the proceedings might be, provided he con-
ducted the litigation properly, and fairly investigated 
the charges brought, and saw a reasonable prospect of 
success. (Robertson v. Robertson, 1881, 6 P. D., 119.) 
The effect of the M. W. P. Acts on this liability is not 
clear. In Harrison v. Harrison, 1888 (T. L. R. iv., 646), 
the facts were as follows:—In May, 1886, Mrs. Harrison 
obtained a decree for dissolution of marriage on the 
ground of her husbands adultery and cruelty. In 
March, 1887, an order was made by Mr. Justice Butt 
directing Mr Harrison to secure to Mrs. Harrison 
during their lives the annual sum of .£130, being 
about one-third of his income. After this order was 
pronounced, Mrs. Harrison changed her solicitors. On 
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June 5th, 1888, her former solicitors obtained from 
Mr. Justice Butt, in Chambers, an order giving them 
a charge, under sec. 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860, for 
the amount of their costs on the sum which had been 
ordered to be paid to Mrs. Harrison for permanent 
maintenance. From that order Mrs. Harrison appealed. 
In giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
Cotton, L. J., said :— 
" It had been said that the solicitors could not, since the passing 
of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, have made any 
claim against the husband for their costs, because since that 
Act a married woman was capable of contracting and could 
bind her separate property. But that was subject to this 
qualification—' unless the contrary is shown *; and here, 
although there was some evidence that the married woman 
had separate property, it appeared on looking at the marriage 
settlement that all her separate property was subject to a 
restraint on anticipation. That fact, therefore, prevented it 
being assumed that there was any contract made by the wife 
with reference to her separate estate. Under the circumstances, 
therefore, he was of opinion that the solicitors had not made 
out a pri?nd facie case that they could not otherwise than by 
obtaining the charging order sought get payment of their costs, 
and, therfore, that there was not a sufficient case made out by 
them to justify the order of Mr. Justice Butt." 
From this case it appears that the separate 
property of the feme covert being subject by the 
marriage settlement to a restraint on anticipation shut 
out the liability for costs. Under sec. 2 of the M. W. P., 
1893, it would probably now be held that a wife who 
has separate property whether subject to restriction or 
not, has no longer the right to pledge her husband's 
credit for costs as formerly, unless his misconduct 
renders them necessary, and that her solicitor would 
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have to look to her alone for payment. Sec. 2 runs as 
follows :— 
" In any action or proceeding now or hereafter instituted by a 
woman or by a next friend on her behalf, the Court before 
which such action or proceeding is pending shall have juris-
diction by judgment or order from time to time to order pay-
ment of the costs of the opposite party out of property which 
is subject to a restraint on anticipation, and may enforce such 
payment by the appointment of a receiver and the sale of the 
property or otherwise as may be just." 
In cases where the husband would be liable for 
necessaries supplied to the wife, he was not liable in 
law for money lent to her, and applied by her in 
procuring necessaries. (Knox v. Buskall, 1857, 
3 C. B. N. S., 334); secus, in Equity (Dearev. Soutten, 
9 Eq., 151) ; and the rule of Equity now prevails 
under the Judicature Act, 1873, sec. 25, sub-sec. n . 
A husband is liable to pay the expenses of his 
wife's funeral, whatever the wife's means may be, and 
whether the parties are living together or apart. 
(Jenkins v. Tucker, 1788, 1 Black, H. 90; .Ambrose v. 
Kerrison, 1851, 10 C. B., 776); unless, perhaps, the 
wife is living apart from him by her own default. A 
person who voluntarily incurs these expenses in good 
faith can recover them from the husband (Bradshaw v. 
Beard, 1862, 12 C. B. N . S., 344). Formerly the 
husband could not reimburse himself out of the wife's 
separate estate unless she had charged it with these 
expenses. (Willeter v. Dobie, 1856, 2 Kay and J., 647.) 
But since the M. W. P., 1882, he probably can (in re 
McMyn, 1886, 33 Ch., D. 575). 
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We submit that if a married woman has obtained 
an order under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married 
Women) Act, 1895, D v which the husband is ordered 
to pay to her a reasonable weekly sum, and the order 
is obeyed, she will thereby be debarred from rendering 
her husband liable on any of her contracts unless his 
authority is expressly given. 
The general and indirect effect of modern legisla-
tion has been to slightly limit the liability of the 
husband on the wife's contracts as his agent. But 
the increase of the wife's contractual power under 
recent legislation has not been accompanied by any 
proportionate decrease in his responsibilities. This 
is not the place, nor have we the presumption to criticise 
the legal position. Nearly 250 years ago the placing 
of the husband in an unreasonable degree at the mercy 
of his wife's agency contracts was thus picturesquely 
commented on by Wyndham, J. :— 
" I f the husband shall be bound by this contract:— 
(1.) "The husband will be accounted the common enemy; and 
the mercer and the gallant will unite with the wife, and they 
will combine their strength against the husband. 
(2.) " Wives will be their own carvers, and like hawks, will fly 
abroad and find their own prey. 
{3.) It shall be left to the pleasure of a London Jury to dress my 
wife in such apparel as they think proper. 
(4..) " To charge the husband on the contract of his wife without 
his actual assent will tend to subvert the law of God and of 
nature, which has given the husband power and government 
over the wife : and this is the very saying of God Himself, 
1 Erga virum appetitus tuns erit, et ipse regnabit in te/ . . . 
True it is, as has been observed by those who have argued 
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for the plaintiff, that the husband, by marriage, declares 
that he will sustain and comfort his wife, and that he says he 
will endow her with his worldly goods. But though husbands 
are bound, 'not by the law of God alone, but by the law of 
nature also, to maintain their wives, yet from this it cannot be 
inferred that they must be bound by their contracts." (Mariby 
v. Scott, as quoted in Smith's L . C , ioth edit., pp. 453-5.) 
We are not concerned here with the discussion of 
this manner of calling to witness the " law of God" and 
the " very saying of God Himself," but English munici-
pal law has most certainly modified the husband's power 
and government over his wife. In short, though in a 
legal sense the effect of modern legislation has been to 
suck the husband's blood, the wife's contractual figure, 
previously attenuated, has attained great rotundity, 
while at the same time the emaciated body of the 
husband has to bear the old burden, but slightly 
reduced in size and weight. 
I I .—G E N E R A L AGENCY. 
The capacity of a person to enter into and incur 
liability upon a contract of agency, whether as principal 
or agent, depends upon his (or her) general capacity to 
contract. (Smally v. Smally, 1700, 1 Eq., Ca. Abr. 6.) 
The contractual ability of a feme covert has been 
enlarged and developed by modern legislation, and in 
accordance with the doctrine laid down in the above-
mentioned old case, her legal status as agent will be 
correspondingly affected. In fact there can be but 
little doubt that she could be made liable for breach of 
warranty of authority, or otherwise, in any case where 
an ordinary agent would be so liable. 
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Contracts with Husband. 
A.—At Common Law husband and wife could not 
contract together (Phillips v. Barnett, 1^ 76, 1 Q. B. D., 
436). In the eye of the law they were one person. I f 
two contracting parties intermarried, the contract was 
suspended during the marriage. Fitzgerald v. Fitz-
gerald, 1868, L. R. 2 P. C, 83.) 
In equity, however, since married women have 
been permitted to acquire and dispose of separate 
estate, the rule has been different, and husband and 
wife, so far as the latter's separate estate is concerned, 
may be bound together by an obligatio. In Woodward 
v. Woodward, 1850 (3 De G. and Sm., 672), Lord 
Westbury laid it down that a wife might enter into a 
contract of loan with her husband by advancing money 
to him out of her separate estate. " I t is quite clear," 
said his Lordship, " that if money, part of the income 
of her separate estate, be handed over by her to her 
husband upon a contract of loan, she may sue her 
husband upon that contract." It has been held in a 
case decided before the Act that a wife may sue her 
husband's executors for money lent to her husband 
(Green v. Carlill, 4 Ch., D. 882). The M. W. P., 
1882, severed the relation between husband and wife 
to this extent, that they are no longer one person in 
law for the purpose of acquiring and holding property. 
Sec. 12 enacts that :— 
" Every woman, whether married before or after this Act, shall 
have in her own name against all persons whomsoever, 
including her husband, the same civil remedies . . . for the 
protection and security of her own separate property, as if 
such property belonged to her as a feme sole." 
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There seems to be no doubt that, taking this 
section together with sees, i and 2, they may mutually 
enter into almosj: every class of contract, and sue one 
another, as freely as though the marriage relation did 
not exist. (Butler v. Butler, 1885, 14 Q. B. D., 831 ; 
McGregor v. McGregor, 1888, 21 Q. B. D., 424.) In 
the earlier case it was held that a husband and wife can 
contract with respect to a loan advanced by the wife to 
her husband out of her separate property, and that the 
remedy is mutual, and also that if the money is paid 
after marriage by the wife to the use of her husband 
in pursuance of a request made before marriage, an 
action for money paid may be brought after the 
marriage. We qualified the statement as to the univer-
sality of contracting power a feme covert now has by 
using the word 44 almost." There may be contracts 
which, if made between husband and wife, would be 
held to be contrary to public policy, and which would 
be held void on that ground. (Lush, p. 398.) We 
appreciate the difficulties clustering round the term 
' 4 public policy." Contracts to do what is illegal, what 
is contra bonos mores, what is contrary to public policy 
are all alike unenforceable. The line of demarcation 
between these classes is at times hard to trace. Sir 
William Anson makes the second class a branch of 
the first. Mr. Justice Burrough in Richardson v. 
Mellish, 1831, 2 Bing., 229, said 4 4 Public policy is a 
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it 
you never know where it will carry you." Another 
English Judge more than half-a-century later said that 
public policy does not admit of definition, and is not 
easily explained ; it is a variable quantity, which must 
E 
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vary, and does vary, with the habits, capacities, and 
opportunities of the public (per Kekewich, J., Dames 
v. Davies, 1887, 36 Ch., D. p. 364), As between 
husband and wife the element of "public policy" comes 
in chiefly in executory contracts for separation and 
separation deeds. A contract providing for mutual 
rights and liabilities in the event of a subsequent 
divorce would doubtless be held to be void on this 
ground. But with regard to agreements for separation 
there has been a gradual change of judicial opinion 
upon the policy of recognizing their validity. This branch 
of the law has not been regulated to any extent by statu-
tory provision, consequently its detailed treatment is 
outside the scope of this Thesis. We will therefore 
only state that until last century the Courts, both of 
Law and Equity refused to recognize any agreement 
between husband and wife, by which they sought 
mutually to release one another from the observance 
of the duties which the marriage relation imposed. It 
was considered that the Ecclesiastical Courts had sole 
cognizance over such matters. In 1766, we find the 
Courts of Law cautiously recognizing such contracts as 
valid. (Rex v. Mead, 1 Bun, 542.) The Courts of 
Equity commenced by holding as valid the "property 
provisions" of such contracts, though the main part of 
the contract containing the provisions relating to 
separation they refused to enforce. (Lush, p. 438 and 
cases there cited.) Even when Courts of Equity had 
arrived at the stage of sanctioning and giving legal 
effect to executed contracts, i.e., contracts which were 
embodied in a final separation deed, they still refused 
to enforce a merely executory contract to live apart, i.e., 
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a contract which contemplated the execution of a future 
final deed, as "articles of separation." This distinc-
tion was, however, finally disposed of by the House of 
Lords in Wilson v. Wilson, 1848 (1 H. L. Ca., 538), 
where it was held that an executory contract for 
separation is valid and binding on the parties, and will 
be specifically enforced by the Court if founded on 
good and valuable consideration. (Lush, p. 408.) 
I t used to be a common form in a separation deed 
to recite that the parties have agreed to live apart from 
one another for the remainder of their joint lives ; and 
the deed frequently contained a covenant by the 
husband, that if, during the life of the wife he shall 
become possessed of any property in her right, she 
shall enjoy it to her separate use. Statute Law has 
now rendered this clause unnecessary ; the M. W. P., 
1882, would secure the property against the marital 
right of the husband. (See post, p. .) 
By 36 Vict., c. 12, sec. 2, it is provided that:— 
" No agreement contained in any separation deed made between 
the father and mother of an infant or infants shall be held to 
be invalid by reason only of its providing that the father of 
such infant or infants shall give up the custody or control 
thereof to the mother; provided always that no Court shall 
enforce any such agreement, if the Court shall be of opinion 
that it will not be for the benefit of the infant or infants to 
to give effect thereto." [ I n this Act an "infant" is a child 
under 16. (Sec. 1.)] 
Although the terms of the section refer to separa-
tion deeds only, ' it is most probable that a similar 
68 
provision contained in an executory contract for separa-
tion would be enforced by the Courts, for if the clause 
is valid in the deed it would be valid in the agreement. 
An agreement, therefore, for separation, by which the 
custody of infant children is to be given to the wife, is 
now in every case to be construed as being subject to 
the power of the Court to deal with it according as the 
Court may consider the interests of the children require. 
The Statute referred to has altered the old law. 
By a well known legal rule the duty of maintaining his 
children and directing their education is cast upon the 
husband, and he is not allowed to relieve himself from 
his responsibilities towards them by entering into any 
agreement inconsistent with the due performance of 
those duties. Hence many clauses contained in 
separation deeds and agreements for separation, pro-
viding for the custody and control of the infant children 
being given to the mother, were held unenforceable. 
In the former case the illegal clause alone would be 
rejected ; in the case of the executory contract the 
whole would be vitiated. The Court would, however, 
give effect to the agreement if it could be shown that 
the father was morally unfit to retain control of the 
children. (See cases cited by Lush, p. 451.) Previous 
to the 1873 Act, an Act was passed in 1839, known as 
Talfourd's Act (2 and 3 Vict., c. 54), which enabled 
the Court in its discretion to give the control of an 
infant child under seven to the mother upon her 
application. This Act contained no express reference 
to agreements between the parties, by separation deed 
or otherwise. I t was repealed by the later Statute. 
6 9 
In Hart v. Hart, 1SS1 (18 Ch., D. 682), Kay, J., 
held that the Chancery Division has power to specifically 
enforce an agreement for the compromise of a matri-
monial suit in the Divorce Court, without infringing 
the Judicature Act prohibiting any one Division of 
the High Court of Justice from interference with 
proceedings pending in any other Division. 
Before the M . W. P. Act, 1882, a wife who had lent 
money to her husband could claim in the administration 
of her husband's estate after his death if there were no 
other creditors " to contend with." (Slanning v. Style, 
J734» 3 P- Wms., 337), but apparently not otherwise. 
If, however, she were administratrix of the husband's 
estate, she might retain out of his estate, though 
insolvent, the amount of a loan which she had made 
for the purposes of his trade or business, and this right 
she still possesses. (In re May, 1890, 45 Ch., D. 490.) 
Apart from this right of retainer which is not affected 
by the 1882 Act, the legal position has been regulated 
by sec. 3 of the said Statute. I t runs thus :— 
(3.) "Any money or other estate of the wife lent or entrusted by 
her to her husband for the purpose of any trade or business 
carried on by him, or otherwise, shall be treated as assets of 
her husband's estate in case of his bankruptcy, under reserva-
tion of the wife's claim to a dividend as a creditor for the 
amount or value of such money or other estate after, but not 
before, all claims of the other creditors of the husband for 
valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been 
satisfied." 
The reason for this enactment has been thus stated 
by Mr. Justice Cave. 
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" Previous to the passing of the M. W. P. Acts, the property of a 
married woman went to her husband, and what she earned or 
acquired, unless her separate property in equity, also became 
the property of her husband, who might deal with it as he 
pleased. When the legislature, therefore, gave to a woman a 
property in her own earnings, or in other money which came 
to her during the marriage and which was not settled to her 
separate use, it had to consider what was to happen if the 
wife lent such money to her husband for the purpose of his 
trade or business, and following out the principle which 
obtains in some of the cases, as, for instance, in the assessment. 
Under the Income Tax Acts, it identified the wife with the 
husband to this extent, that if she chose to make use of this 
power which was given her and to say that the money was 
hers and must be treated as a loan to her husband, then that 
she, at all events, should be identified with him to such an 
extent that she should not be able to claim a dividend until 
the other creditors had received twenty shillings in the pound." 
(In re Tuff, 1887, 19 Q. B. D., 88.) 
The combined effect of this section, and sec. 10 
of the Judicature Act, 1875, is that in the administration 
of an insolvent estate by the Court the claim of the 
widow for money lent for the purposes of deceased's 
trade is postponed to the claims of his other creditors. 
( In re Leng, 1895, 1 Ch., 652.) The section extends 
to the case of a wife the principle of sec. 3 of the 
Partnership Act, 1890, in case of the husband's bank-
ruptcy the wife taking the place of a person advancing 
money to the husband in consideration of receiving a 
share of the profits of a business. (Exp. District Bank, 
1885, 16 Q. B. D., 700.) A husband who makes a loan 
to his wife for the purposes of her separate trade will, 
it is submitted, be postponed to her trade creditors by 
the operation of the same Act. There is no provision 
applicable to such a case in the M. W. P., 1882. 
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The section only applies where the husband is a 
sole trader. Accordingly, where the wife lends her 
money to a trading partnership of which her husband 
is a member, she is, notwithstanding the section, 
entitled to prove in the bankruptcy of the partnership 
against the joint estate in competition with other 
creditors. The section is not retrospective. (Lush, p. 
400, and cases there cited.) 
Sec. 3 of the 1882 Act has no application to a loan 
by a wife for purposes other than her husband's trade 
or business (Exp. Tidswell, 1887, 56 L . J. Q. B., 548 ; 
Mackintosh v. Pogose, 1895, 1 Ch., 505). The burden 
of proving that the loan was not for the purposes of 
trade is on the wife if the husband is a trader (Exp. 
District Bank, 1885, 16 Q. B. D., 700). But i f she 
discharges this burden, she may prove in his bankruptcy 
in competition with other creditors. 
The Act has not affected the power of a married 
woman to bind by her contracts such real estate as she 
may have become possessed of before the Act came 
into operation, not settled to her separate use. And 
therefore, a contract between husband and wife relating 
to such property will still be ineffectual to the same 
extent as it was before the Statute, f Williams v. 
Walker, 9 Q. B. D., 576.) 
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Procedure. 
In addition to what has already been said relative 
to proceedings by and against married women (see 
pages 3, 9, 11-14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29-31, 36-39, 
50), a few more remarks on this branch of the subject 
are here submitted. We will confine ourselves to such 
procedure as appears to arise (inter alia), out of con-
tract and its breach. A t Common Law a married 
woman could not sue as a feme sole unless she carried 
on a trade within the custom of the City of London, 
or her husband was civiliter tnortuus. (Pages 2 and 
3.) She could only sue as co-plaintiff with her husband. 
In Chancery she could not sue either by herself or her 
next friend without her husband, except by leave of 
the Court on giving such security for costs as the 
Court might require. I f sued at Common Law she 
could by pleading an abatement insist on her husband 
being joined as defendant. In Chancery, also, he 
was regularly made a defendant, unless by leave of 
the Court, (Daniell Chancery Practice, 6th edit, pp. 
119, 185.) We omitted to mention sec. 11 of the 
M. W. P., 1870, which runs as follows :— 
11. "A married woman may maintain an action in her own name 
for the recovery of any wages, earnings, money, and property 
by this Act declared to be her separate property, or of any 
property belonging to her before marriage, and which her 
husband shall, by writing under his hand, have agreed with 
her shall belong to her after marriage as her separate property, 
and she shall have in her own name the same remedies, both 
. civil and criminal, against all persons whomsoever for the 
protection and security of such wages, earnings, money, and 
property, and of any chattels, or other property purchased or 
obtained by means thereof for her own use, as if such wages, 
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earnings, moneys, chattels, and property belonged to her 
as an unmarried woman; and in any indictment or other 
proceeding it shall be sufficient to allege such wages, earnings, 
money, chattels, and property to be her property." 
I t has been held since 1882, that a married woman 
may now sue alone without giving security for costs, 
even though she has no separate property available for 
costs. ( In re Isaac, 1885, 30 Ch., D. 418.) But she 
may be ordered to secure the costs of an appeal. 
( Wkittaker v. Kershaw, 1890, 44 Ch., D. 296.) Suing 
for an injunction she must give the ordinary undertaking 
in damages ; and her undertaking is sufficient even 
though she does not possess separate property free 
from restraint on anticipation (Pike v. Cave, 1893, 62 
L . J., Ch. 937). Where a married woman pays a sum 
into Court as a condition of having leave to defend 
under Order 14, a successful plaintiff is entitled to have 
the sum paid out and need not await an inquiry whether 
the married woman has separate estate liable to execu-
tion (Bird v. Barstow, 1892, 1 Q. B., 94). 
Before the M . W. P., 1893, costs could only be 
obtained from the property of a feme covert not subject 
to restraint on anticipation. ( In re Glanville, 31 Ch., 
D. 532.) This, however, is now altered. Sec. 2 of the 
said Act enacts :— 
2. " In any action or proceeding now or hereafter instituted by a 
woman or by a next friend on her behalf, the Court before 
which such action or proceeding is pending shall have jurisdic-
tion by judgment or order from time to time to order payment 
of the costs of the opposite party out of property which is 
subject to a restraint on anticipation, and may enforce such 
payment by the appointment of a receiver and the sale of the 
property or otherwise as may be just." 
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The term " action instituted" does not apply to an 
order made before the Act came into operation ; nor 
does it Jnclude motions or appeals by the defendant. 
(Hood-Barrs v. Cat heart, 1894, 3 Ch., 376.) I t means 
some action or proceeding in the nature of an action 
initiated by a married woman (ibid). I t applies to an 
action brought by a married woman, and pending when 
the Act came into operation so as to enable the Court 
to direct that separate estate subject to restraint be 
resorted to for the payment of the costs of the action. 
The presentation of a petition in an action by a married 
woman is not a " proceeding instituted" within the 
section (Hollington v. Dear, 1895, W. N . (95), 35, nor 
is the lodging of a ''caveat" in a probate suit. (Moran 
v. Place, 1896, P. 214.) But a counter-claim is an 
action or proceeding within it. (Hood-Barrs v. Cat heart, 
l%95> 1 Q- B., 873.) The section has been recently 
held by the House of Lords only to apply to an action 
brought by a married woman, and not to an appeal 
instituted by her. (Hood-Barrs v. Crossman, &c, 
1897, T . L . R. xiii . , 291.) 
" With Costs"—An order dismissing the action of 
married women "wi th costs" should make them pay-
able out of her separate estate. (Gahnoye v. Cowan, 
58 L. J. Ch., 769.) The form should run thus : "That 
the defendant recover against the plaintiff his costs in 
this action, such costs to be taxed by the taxing master 
and to be payable out of her separate property," or 
" with liberty to apply for payment out of any property 
which is subject to restraint on anticipation." (Davies 
v. Treharris Co., 1894, W. N . , 198.) The costs 
ordered to be paid by a married woman may be set off 
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against costs ordered to be paid to her. (Pelton v. 
Harrison, 1891, r Q. B., 118.) 
By R. S. C , Order 9 and 3, a husband and wife, 
i f sued together, must both be served with writs, when 
suing together they must make discovery by separate 
affidavits. (Fendall v. O'Conne/l, 1885, 29 Ch., D. 899.) 
As we have seen (p. 64), husband and wife can now 
take civil proceedings against each other. This right 
though qualified as regards tort is almost absolute in 
the case of contract. Sec. 17 of the M . W. P., 1882, 
deals fully with the determination of questions between 
husband and wife. We conclude this section by quoting 
the following summary of the judgments of Lopes, L. J., 
and Smith, L . J., in re Lynes, 1893 (2 Q. B., 113). 
Lopes, L . J. :— 
" The bankruptcy notice must be in accordances with the terms of 
the judgment, and must be in the form given in Form No. 6 
in the Appendix to the Bankruptcy Rules, 1886. That form 
was not applicable to a judgment against a married woman 
The present decision did not interfere with what this Court 
said in Pelton Brothers v. Harrison, 1892, (1 Q. B., 118), 
and their decision now only went to this—that sub-sec. 1 ( g ) 
of sec. 4 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, was not applicable to 
a married woman. Sec. 1, sub-sec. 5, of the Married Women's 
Property Act, 1882, was not, therefore, rendered useless, as 
other sub-sees, of sec. 4 might be made available against a 
married woman trading separately." 
A. L . Smith, L . J. :— 
"In the case of Ex parte Hughes, 1892 (1 Q. B., 628), this 
Court held that a bankruptcy notice must follow the terms 
of the judgment. Here the judgment was for payment out 
of the married woman's separate estate. The bankruptcy 
notice, which alone the Act entitled the creditor to issue, was 
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a notice requiring her to pay personally. Such a notice was 
not applicable to this case." 
A n important question of bankruptcy law has 
lately come before the Court of Appeal in the case of 
in re Frances Handford Cf Co., 1899, T . L . R. xv., 
197. Is a married woman trading separately from her 
husband under a firm name to be made bankrupt for 
non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice founded upon 
a judgment against the firm? The Court decided 
she could not be made a bankrupt. The judgment of 
Lindley, M. R., illustrates the present legal position of 
a married woman with regard to bankruptcy so clearly 
we give it in full as reported in the "Times" Law 
Reports. 
" The Master of the Rolls said that this appeal raised a new and 
interesting point. Here was a married woman trading under 
the name of Frances Handford and Co., and he assumed for 
the purposes of his judgment that she was trading separately 
from her husband. Some persons supplied the firm with 
goods in the ordinary way of business and, as was common 
enough, did not take the trouble to find out of whom the firm 
consisted. They then issued a writ against the firm for the 
price of the goods and obtained judgment quite regularly 
under Order 14 against Frances Handford and Co. Having 
obtained that judgment they issued a bankruptcy notice and 
sought to have this lady made a bankrupt. Upon the 
assumption that this lady was trading apart from her husband, 
it was plain that she was liable to be adjudicated a bankrupt, 
because the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, by sec. 1, 
sub-sec. 5, provided that every married woman carrying on a 
trade separately from her husband should, in respect of her 
separate property, be subject to the bankruptcy laws in the 
same way as if she were a feme sole. What was the legal 
effect of that? In Scott v. Morley (20 Q. B. IX, 120), the 
77 
form in which a judgment ought to be entered against a 
married woman was settled by the Court of Appeal. That 
form provided that the sum recoverable should be payable out 
of her separate property as thereinafter mentioned, and not 
otherwise, and it was ordered that execution thereon should 
be limited to the separate property of the defendant not 
subject to any restriction against anticipation unless, by reason 
of sec. 19 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the 
property should be liable to execution notwithstanding such 
restriction. It had been decided more than once that a 
married woman, although she might be made a bankrupt for 
other causes, could not be made a bankrupt upon a judgment 
in that form. What then was the effect of a judgment against 
a married woman in the name of a trading firm ? Upon 
looking at Order 48a, rule 11, coupled with rules 4, 5, and 8, 
it was not very difficult to see what it was. The effect was 
that the judgment concealed the truth but did not alter it. If 
it were a question of setting this judgment aside his Lordship 
would not do so without consideration. But although Order 
48a as a matter of convenience allowed an action to be 
brought against a firm in the firm name and allowed judgment 
to be obtained against the firm, in truth and in fact the action 
and the judgment were against the individuals who constituted 
the firm. His Lordship was therefore of opinion that the 
married woman could not be made a bankrupt upon a 
judgment in this form." 
Section 2 4 of 1 8 8 2 Act. 
This section enacts :— 
"The word 'contract' in this Act shall include the acceptance of 
any trust, or of the office of executrix or administratrix, and 
the provisions of this Act as to liabilities of married women 
shall extend to all liabilities by reason of any breach of trust 
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or devastavit committed by any married woman being a trustee 
or executrix or administratrix either before or after her marriage, 
and her husband shall not be subject to such liabilities unless 
he has acted or intermeddled in the trust or administration." 
Previous to this enactment a married woman could 
not accept the office of trustee or executor without her 
husband's consent. I f he consented to her acceptance 
of the trust he was liable for the breaches of trust, 
(Bakin and Hughes, 18S6, 31 Ch., D., 390) and was 
entitled to exercise control over, and his concurrence 
was necessary to, the execution of the trust. The 
husband was the owner of the trust estate almost as 
completely as if the wife were entitled to it beneficially. 
The wife could not dispose of it without the husband's 
concurrence, but the estate was not liable to satisfy the 
husband's debts. (Farr v. Newman, 1792, 4 T . R., 
621.) The wife could continue the representation of a 
testator's estate by will without her husband's concur-
rence. (Willock v. Noble, 1875, L . R. 7, H . C. 580.) 
The husband, on the other hand, could dispose of the 
testator's estate without the wife's concurrence. (In re 
Wood, 1861, 3 De G. F. and J., 126; Soadyv. Turnbull, 
1866. L . R , 1 Ch., 494.) He could release debts 
owing to the estate, but could not sue without joining 
the wife. 
By virtue of the above-quoted sec. 24 of the Act, 
a married woman may now accept a trust, or the office 
of executrix or administratrix, and her husband need 
not join in the administration bond. (In the goods of 
Harriet Ayres, 1883, 8 P. D , 168.) 
Sec. r8 of the Act reads as follows :— 
79 
"A married woman who is an executrix or administratrix alone or 
jointly with any other person or persons of the estate of any 
deceased person, or a trustee alone or jointly, as aforesaid, of 
property subject to any trust, may sue or be sued, and may 
transfer or join in transferring any such annuity or deposit, as 
aforesaid, (i.e., as mentioned in sec. 6), or any sum forming 
part of the public stocks or funds, or of any other stocks or 
funds transferable, as aforesaid, or any share, stock, debenture, 
debenture stock, or other benefit, right, claim, or other interest 
of or in any such corporation, company, public body, or society 
in that character, without her husband, as if she were a feme 
sole. 
I t is not easy to construe the two sections together. 
, There is no power given to a married woman who 
is a trustee of real estate to convey the same, she can 
only do so by an acknowledged deed and with the 
concurrence of her husband, and with the other form-
alities of the Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833, as 
slightly modified by the Conveyancing Act. 1882. Sec. 
18 gives a somewhat particular account of the Trust 
personalty which a feme covert may transfer as a feme 
sole, but it is silent as to the transfer of land. By sec. 
6 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act indeed she can 
convey such property as a "bare trustee," and sec. 16 
of the Trustee Act, 1893, enacts that "when any 
freehold or copyhold hereditament is vested in a 
married woman as a bare trustee she may convey or 
surrender it as i f she were a feme sole." But it has 
been clearly laid down in a recent case that where a 
married woman is trustee of real estate (and not a bare 
trustee), she cannot convey the same without the 
formalities of an acknowledged deed, and the con-
currence of her husband. ( In re Harkness and A llsopp, 
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1896, 2 Ch., 358.) The result of this decision is a 
strange contradiction. By sec. 24, the husband is not 
to be liable for breaches of trust committed by the wife, 
unless he intermeddles, but under the decision just 
mentioned he is, when real property is the subject of 
the trust, made to intermeddle. This disability, how-
ever, does not attach to a married woman who is a 
mortgagee in respect of separate property, and who, 
not having entered into possession of the mortgaged 
land, is in no sense a trustee of it for the mortgagor.. 
( In re Brooke ana Fremlion, 1898, 1 Ch., 647.) 
Mr. Lush (Lush, p. 158-9), considers that sec. 18 
is retrospective ; its object being to enable married 
women who are already trustees to sue for monies, 
transfer stock, & c , although assets or trust property 
reduced into possession before the Act would not be 
divested from the husband's possession. She may 
therefore get in outstanding assets, &c», and give a 
valid discharge for them as if she were a feme sole; 
and may sue without joining her husband. As regards 
her own acts and defaults she may also be sued without 
her husband. 
Where a married woman is a trustee, it appears 
that in view of the important decision previously quoted 
(In re Harkness, dfc.)y it is doubtful whether she can 
disclaim otherwise than under the provisions of 8 and 9 
Vic t , c, 106, sec. 7 (extending the provisions of the 
Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833). 
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A P P E N D I X . 
Contracts under the Matrimonial 
Causes Acts, &c. 
(REFERRED TO AS " T H E DIVORCE ACTS.") 
Before the M . W. P. Acts, 1870-93 became law a 
group of exceptions to the contractual powerlessness 
of a married woman was created by the Divorce Acts, 
1857 and 1858. Under these Acts a woman divorced 
from her husband is restored to the position of a feme 
sole. We are only concerned, however, with the 
changes in the legal status where the matrimonial bond 
is unbroken. Sec. 26 of the Divorce Act, 1857 (20 
and 21 Vict., c. 85), provides : — 
"In every case of a judical separation the wife shall, whilst so 
separated, be considered as a feme sole for the purposes of 
contract and wrongs and injuries, and suing and being sued 
in any civil proceeding, and her husband shall not be liable m 
respect of any engagement or contract she may have entered 
into, or for any wrongful act or omission by her or for any 
costs she may incur as plaintiff or defendant; provided that 
where, upon any such judical separation, alimony has been 
decreed or ordered to be paid to the wife and the same shall 
not be duly paid by the husband, he shall be liable for 
necessaries supplied for her use: provided also, that nothing 
shall prevent the wife from joining at any time during such 
separation, in the exercise of any joint power given to herself 
and her husband." 
And by sec. 21 a wife deserted by her husband, 
and having obtained a protection order from a 
F 
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Magistrate or from the Court is ' ' i n the like position 
with regard to property and contracts," and suing and 
being sued, as she would be under this* Act if she had 
obtained a judical separation. 
By the Act of 1858 (21 and 22 Vict., c. 108), it 
was provided (sec. 8) that property of or to which the 
wife was possessed or entitled for an estate in remainder 
or reversion at the time of the desertion should be 
deemed to be included in the protection given by the 
order. And by way of forerunner to sec. 24 of the 
M . W. P., 1882, the 7th sec. enacted that the protection 
order was to be deemed to extend to any property to 
which the wife should become entitled as trustee, 
executrix, or administratrix since the commencement of 
the desertion, the death of her testator or testatrix 
being deemed to be the time at which she became 
entitled. 
By the same sections a married woman is enabled 
to act in a trust as a feme sole while a judicial separation 
or protection order is in force, and can transfer stock, 
for example, standing in a testator's name, without her 
husband's concurrence. (Bathe v. Bank of England, 
1858, 4 Kay and J., 564J 
These Divorce Acts are still in force as regards the 
proprietary and contractual rights of married women 
judicially separated, and who, deserted by their husbands, 
have obtained protection orders. But since January 
1 st, 1883, the provisions of the Divorce Acts and the 
M . W. P., 1882, are construed together. 
The property specifically mentioned in the Divorce 
Acts as protected by the order is of a limited character 
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and in this respect differs from the comprehensive 
ownership under the M . W. P., 1882. On the other hand 
her contractual power is made absolute, for the 1857 
Act unlike the 1882 Act, did not say she could only 
contract with respect to her separate property. Con-
sequently under the former Act the feme covert can 
probably in every case be made a bankrupt. But the 
Divorce Acts dealt with a state of circumstances which 
might arise whilst a woman was married. They did not 
deal with a state of circumstances which might exist 
before she was or after she ceased to be a married 
woman. Consequently the intention of the legislature 
is that property which a feme covert has become entitled 
to before the commencement of a desertion or judicial 
separation shall not be interfered with. I t has therefore 
been held in a recent case that the property of a married 
woman for her separate use, with a restraint against 
anticipation, is still subject to the restraint after she has 
obtained a protection order in consequence of her 
husband's desertion. (Hill v. Cooper, 1893, T . L. R., 
ix., 457-) 
A protection order only protects money or property 
acquired by a married woman in lawful industry, so that 
where a wife who has been deserted by her husband and 
had obtained a protection order kept a brothel, it was 
held that the profits she made were not protected. 
(Mason v. Mitchell, 3, H . and C , 528.) 
A protection order is retrospective in its operation, 
and dates back to the desertion, so that property acquired 
by the wife during the desertion, but before the order 
granted, iswithin the protection. But although it enables 
the wife to sue in contract, or in tort, as though she were 
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a feme sole, i t is not retrospective so as to enable her to 
maintain an action as a feme sole which she could not 
maintain alone at the time it was commenced. 
A question might arise as to the right of a married 
woman who had obtained a protection order before the 
operation of the M . W. P., 1882, and had acquired 
property in possession under it, to retain it as her sep-
arate property if the order was discharged, or if the 
parties returned to cohabitation, after that Act had come 
into operation. For the discussion of this question, which 
involves the co-construe of sec. 5 of the later Act, we 
would refer to Lush, p. 125. 
The Statute of 1857 in effect enacts that a wife 
who has obtained a protection order shall not pledge 
her husband's credit for necessaries; for sec. 21 provides 
that she shall be in the same position as a wife who is 
judicially separated from her husband ; and by sec. 26 
a wife who is judicially separated from her husband has 
no authority to pledge his credit for necessaries except 
when alimony may be decreed and not paid. From the 
Act also is evolved a recognition of a contract between 
husband and wife, for, according to Mr. Lush, " I f the 
judicially separated parties return to cohabitation all the 
property which the feme covert may be entitled to at the 
time the cohabitation takes place belongs to her for her 
separate use, subject to any agreement in writing made 
between them whilst separate." (p. 122.) 
Various remedies have from time to time been 
passed to give a more summary remedy to a deserted 
wife than those under the Divorce Acts. These have 
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now all been repealed and superseded by the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (before 
referred to). The Act empowers a Court of Summary 
Jurisdiction for a district in which the complaint has 
wholly or partially arisen, to intervene on the application 
of a wife who (1) has been deserted by her husband, or 
(2) has been caused to live separately and apart from 
him by his persistent cruelty to her, or his wilful neglect 
to provide reasonable maintenance for her and her 
infant children, whom he is reasonably bound to main-
tain. If satisfied of the truth and justice of the wife's 
complaint, the Court may make an order containing 
(inter alia) the following provision :—That the wife 
need no longer cohabit with her husband,—which, while 
in force has the same effect as a decree of judical 
separation by the High Court, including that of putting 
her in a position of a feme sole. The legal environment 
of a feme sole includes proprietary and contractual 
ability to the extent enunciated in the Divorce Acts. 
It does not appear to be certain that the position 
of the wife who has obtained a protection order is in 
all respects precisely the same as that of the judicially 
separated wife. The Divorce Acts do not seem to 
have provided that if the former party returns to 
cohabitation, such property as she has acquired during 
the desertion shall belong to her as her separate 
property. They provide (as we have seen) for such a 
consequence in case of cohabitation after judicial 
separation. The Act of 1857 only states that "during 
the continuance" of such order the wife shall be deemed 
to have been during such desertion of her in the like 
position in all respects with regard to property, &c, as 
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she would be in if she had obtained a decree of judical 
separation. (See in re Emery s Trusts, 1884, 50 L . T . , 
197 ; Ewart v. Chubb, 1875, R., 20 Eq., 454,) 
The trading and industrial profits of a married 
woman separated from her husband under the Divorce 
Acts and the S. J. Act, 1895, a r e » w e have seen, now 
fully protected by law. This protection, however, is 
not altogether a novelty in English law. " I f a wife 
was deserted by her husband, and during the desertion 
she carried on a separate trade and acquired property 
thereby, the Court would protect her earnings against 
her husband if he afterwards endeavoured to possess 
himself of them." (Lush, p. 161.) 
